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Introduction
For a peace [in Bosnia] to last, several key conditions must be met.., any
agreement must guarantee that the human rights of all the citizens of the-
region are respected. This terrible war has uprooted people from every eth-
* Eric Rosand is an Attorney-Adviser in the U.S. Department of State's Office of
the Legal Adviser. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent those of the Department of State.
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nic community. All-must be able to return home or to receive just
compensation.
1
"Not knowing what else to do, the elderly Bosnian-Serb widow just sat
down on a rock beside a green stagnant pool, in the middle of a field less
than a mile from the home that was once hers."2 After having traveled for
five hours by bus, the seventy-one year old woman says, "I am desper-
ate .... They say there is no money to pay my pension. All I have is my
home, over there."3 She is unwilling to return to her home for fear that the
Muslims will kill her, yet is unable to receive any compensation to ease her
desperation and to assist her in rebuilding her life somewhere else.4
This displaced Bosnian-Serb is just one of the estimated 2.2 million
Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks (Bosnian-Muslims)5 who either left or were
driven from their homes during and in the immediate aftermath of the
forty-three month Bosnian war.6 Thousands of these victims, unwilling or
unable to return, have chosen to relocate. Many more will follow. The vast
majority, however, relocated without receiving any compensation for their
most valuable, and often only, asset - the home they left behind. Yet most
of the survivors of the Bosnian war who lost their homes are left without
redress. Numerous observers focused on the importance of securing the
1. Warren Chiistopher, Statement at the Opening of the Balkan Proximity Peace
Talks (Nov. 1, 1995) in WARREN CHRISTOPHER, IN THE STREAM of HISTORY: SHAPING FOR-
EIGN PoLcY FOR A NEw ERA 362 (1998).
2. Mike O'Connor, Fearful Serb is Journeying, Almost Home in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 1998, at A9.
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. See SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE
COLD WAR 315 (1995) (discussing the decision of Bosnian Prime Minister Haris
Silajdzic to urge the adoption of the term Bosniak instead of Muslim). The term Bosniak
reflects Bosnian Muslims' nationality, as opposed to their religion. The Human Rights
Watch group explains:
Their current status as "Muslims" is viewed by some as an inaccurate label
because it defines a people's nationality solely on the basis of their religious
belief. Furthermore, the term "Muslim(s)" used as a nationality title is disap-
proved of by many countries in which Islam is the dominant religion, as well as
by many "Muslims" of Bosnia-Herzegovina themselves.
Northwestern Bosnia: Human Rights Abuses during a Cease-Fire and Peace Negotiations,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/HELSINKI, Feb. 1996, at 6.
6. For purposes of this article, the term Serbs refers to Bosnian-Serbs and the term
Croats refers to Bosnian-Croats, i.e., those Serbs and Croats who live or lived in Bosnia.
The Bosnian war was one of the conflicts that erupted following the dissolution of the
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). In June 1991, following Slove-
nia's and Croatia's withdrawal from the SFRY after unsuccessful negotiations among the
six republics, Prime Minister Markovic and the Parliament ordered the Yugoslav
National Army (JNA) to maintain the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. These efforts
proved unsuccessful in Slovenia. In Croatia, however, the JNA forces, together with the
Krajina Serbs (Serbs living in the Krajina region of the Republic of Croatia), managed to
gain control of some 30% of Croatian territory. The fighting then spread into Bosnia
shortly after the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared full independence from
the SFRY on March 3, 1992. For a detailed discussion of the war, see, for example,
LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAvIA: DEATH OF A NATION (1996); MIsHA GLENNY,
THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA (3d ed. 1996); CHRISTOPHER BENNETT, YUGOSLAVIA'S BLOODY COL-
LAPSE: CAUSES, COURSE AND CONSEQUENCES (1995).
Vol. 33
2000 Right to Compensation in Bosnia
'right of return for all Bosnian refugees and displaced persons.7 No one,
however, adequately addressed the right of compensation for those who
chose not to return, the impact that the implementation of such a right
might have on the region, and the significant precedent it could establish
under international law.
On December 14, 1995, representatives of the Bosniaks, Bosnian-
Serbs, and Bosnian-Croats signed the General Framework Agreement for
Peace (DPA) in Paris.8 This agreement brought an end to the fighting that
had plagued Bosnia9 since April 1992, in what was the most violent and
disruptive war Europe had seen in half a century. Warren Christopher,
then Secretary of State, who announced the cease-fire agreement at Dayton,
Ohio, stated that the parties "agreed that four years of destruction is
enough. The time has come to build peace with justice."'10 One of the
foundational principles of the peace negotiated at Dayton was that all refu-
gees and displaced persons" would be given the right to return to their
7. See David L. Bosco, Reintegrating Bosnia: A Progress Report, WASH. Q., Spring
1998, at 65; Robert S. Gelbard, Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee Subcommittee on Europe, in FED. NEWs SEav., July 17, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File; Arthur C. Helton, Bosnia's Unjust Laws, WASH. Posr, Aug.
26, 1997, at A15; Elisabeth Rehn, Report on The Situation of Human Rights in the Terri-
tory of the Forner Yugoslavia 117, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/56 (1997); Amnesty Interna-
tional, 'Who's Living in my House?' Obstacles to the Safe Return of Refugees and Displaced
People 1, EUR 63/01/97 (Mar. 19, 1997) [hereinafter Amnesty International, Who's Liv-
ing in my House?]; James A. Schear, Bosnia's Post-Dayton Traumas, 104 FOREIGN POL'Y 87,
94 (1996).
8. See generally General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina with Annexes, Dec. 14, 1995, Bosn.-Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., 35 I.L.M. 75 [hereinafter
DPA]. The terms of this agreement were negotiated and agreed to in Dayton, Ohio. For a
detailed account of the negotiations leading to the agreement, see RicHARD HOLBRooKE,
To END A WAR (1998). The instrument concluded in Dayton and signed in Paris was the
General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which
11 annexes were attached. Under the GFAP, the parties agreed to accept a single state,
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia), consisting of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (the Federation) comprising 51% of the territory of Bosnia in a
number of cantons divided ethnically between Bosniaks and Croats, and the largely Serb
Republika Srpska (the RS), comprising 49% of the territory. Under the State (i.e., Bos-
nian) Constitution, laid out in Annex 4, each entity has its own parliament, government,
police force, and army, and carries out most of the functions of a state. See DPA, supra,
Annex 4, art. I1, cl 2. The central governmeit of Bosnia, on the other hand, has a loose
form consisting of a parliament, council of ministers, and a three-person presidency.
Thus, it is responsible for a very limited number of issues: foreign affairs and trade,
customs and monetary policy, immigration, inter-entity criminal law enforcement, com-
munications, transport, and air traffic control. See DPA, supra, Annex 4, art. III, cl 1.
9. The sovereign state of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its inde-
pendence on March 3, 1992. Upon the entry into force of the DPA, however, the Repub-
lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina became "Bosnia and Herzegovina." See DPA, supra note 8,
Annex 4, art. I.
10. Warren Christopher, Keynote Remarks at the Initialing of the Balkan Proximity
Peace Talks Agreement, in THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FomiumE YUGOSLAVIA
342 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1997).
11. "Refugees" are those who have left their homes and fled to a country outside of
Bosnia, whereas "displaced persons" are those who fled their homes but remained in
Bosnia. This article shall refer to both refugees and displaced persons as "dislocated
persons."
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pre-war homes or receive compensation for their home should they choose
not to return - a measure of justice 12 for the more than two million people
who fled or were driven from their homes during the conflict. 13
Annex Seven of the DPA explicitly refers to these twin rights and estab-
lishes a body to facilitate the ability of refugees and displaced persons to
exercise them.14 More than four years into implementation of this cease-
fire agreement, however, neither one of these guarantees has been ade-
quately provided for: over 1.8 million people remain unable to return to
their pre-war homes or receive compensation for their property to assist
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as amended by the 1967
Protocol, Article 1(2), defines a refugee as any person who,
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152;
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268.
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement submitted by the Secretary-Gen-
eral's Special Representative for Internally Displaced Persons to the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights, defines internally displaced persons as:
persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave
their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in
order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence,
violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have
not crossed an internationally recognized State border.
Annex 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add2. See generally FRANCIS DENG & ROBERTA
COHEN, MASSES IN FLIGHT: THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF INTERNAL DIscoNm'r (1998) (discussing
the informal legal regime that applies to protect displaced persons).
Despite this difference in definition, the root causes that generate refugees and dis-
placed persons are essentially the same: human rights abuses and armed conflicts.
Nevertheless, those who cross international borders are protected by a series of interna-
tional treaties and organizations. See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
Protocol, supra; Protocal Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra. Those who remain
within the national border receive minimal formal legal or institutional protection.
12. A sense among the survivors of the Bosnian war that "justice" has followed the
atrocities of the war may be necessary to ensure that the violence that has plagued the
former Yugoslavia for the entire 20th century does not continue. One observer wrote:
[t]he resentments that Serbs harbored against Croats for the unpunished crimes
of the Ustasha state during World War II was a major factor in the catastrophic
developments in ex-Yugoslavia more than four decades later. Justice provides
closure; its absence not only leaves wounds open, but its very denial rubs salt in
them.
ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMEs: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE
213 (1998). See also Peace, Justice and Support for the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal:
Hearing Before the House Int'l Relations Comm., 104th Cong. 9 (1995) (statement of
Thomas S. Warrick, Special Counsel, Coalition for Int'l Justice) (stating that today's
victims want justice before the cycle of violence resumes in a very short amount of time).
13. For a discussion of how the inclusion of the possibility of compensation in
Annex Seven weakens the right to return, see, for example, Marcus Cox, The Right to
Return Home: International Intervention and Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 599, 611 (1998) [hereinafter Cox, The Right to Return].
14. Article VII establishes an "independent Commission for Displaced Persons and
Refugees," later renamed the Commission on Real Property Claims for Displaced Per-
sons and Refugees (CRPC). See DPA, supra note 8, annex 7, art. VII, at 138.
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them in their efforts to resettle. Implementation of the DPA's declared right
to return has been a high priority for the international community, as its
main post-war goal has been the reversal of "ethnic cleansing"1 5 through
the return of refugees and displaced persons. The right to compensation1 6
enunciated in the DPA, on the other hand, has been largely ignored for fear
that a refugee or displaced person's ability to receive compensation might
interfere with the primary goal of ethnic reintegration.
This Article highlights the importance of implementing the DPA's pro-
visions regarding the right to compensation. The availability of compensa-
tion would provide financial assistance to the thousands of dislocated
persons who wish to resettle, rather than return home. It would also offer
these victims some redress for the violations of property rights that consti-
tuted the most prevalent human rights abuse during the war as well as the
main humanitarian consequence of the displacement. 17 Further, assuming
that the Bosnian Government funds any compensation mechanism, it
might serve as an important precedent for developing a customary interna-
tional law principle that refugees who are unwilling or unable to return to
their original homes are entitled to be compensated by their State of origin,
for property they have left behind. Moreover, if this right becomes part of
customary international law, it could be used, along with the more devel-
oped right to return, to deter States from creating the conditions that lead
to mass flows of refugees and displaced persons. Any gains made as a
result of "ethnic cleansing" campaigns would either be reversed through
15. Although "coined in the early 1980s by the Serbian ultranationalist leader Vojis-
lav Seselj ... it was only after the outbreak of hostilities in 1991 that the term attained
its sad notoriety." Alfred de Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, Ethnic Cleansing, and
the International Right to One's Homeland, 6 CRiM. L.F. 257, 260 n.12 (1995) [hereinafter
de Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland]. According to the Commission of Experts, estab-
lished pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 to investigate serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the former Yugoslavia, the expression
"ethnic cleansing" means "rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or
intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area." Letter from the Secretary-
General to the President of the Security Council, Feb. 9, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993)
(transmitting Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 780, 11 55-56 (1992)). The Special Rapporteur to the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights concluded that the term "ethnic cleansing" refers to the
elimination by the ethnic group asserting control over a given territory of member of
other ethnic groups. See Report on The Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia, 1 9, U.N. Doc. A/47/666 (1992) [hereinafter Periodic Report]. For a
complete discussion of the expression and its origin, see generally AmhNav BELL-
FiALKoFF, ETHNIC CLEANSING (1996); Drazen Petrovic, Ethnic Cleansing: An Attempt at
Methodology, 5 Euo J. INr'L L. 342 (1994).
16. In the context of the discussions of Bosnia in this Article, the right to compensa-
tion refers to the right of refugees and displaced persons to receive compensation for
their real property in lieu of return. For a discussion of their right of compensation for
other losses, see, for example, Amnesty International, Bosnia: The International Commu-
nity's Responsibility to Ensure Human Rights, EUR 63/14/96 (June 1996), <http://
www.amnesty.it/ailib/aipub/1996/EUR/46301496.htm> [hereinafter Amnesty Interna-
tional, The International Community's Responsibility to Ensure Human Rights].
17. See Marcus Cox, Strategic Approaches to International Intervention in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, in THIRD INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORUM, CLUSTER OF COMPETENCE, THE
REHABILITATION OF W~AR-ToRN SoCIETIES 38 (1998) [hereinafter Cox, Strategic Approaches].
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the return of the dislocated or would prove too costly, as the responsible
State would be required to compensate those refugees and displaced per-
sons for their property to which they chose not to return.
Part I of this article examines the "ethnic cleansing" that took place
during the 'conflict and evaluates the so-far unsuccessful efforts of the
international community to achieve its goal of ethnic re-integration. Part II
evaluates the right to compensation under Annex Seven, addresses the
international community's reluctance to promote the exercise of the right
to compensation, and argues the different positive effects the successful
implementation of this right would have in the region. Part III analyzes
whether the right to compensation provided in Annex Seven and the obli-
gation of the current Bosnian government to provide such compensation
are supported by recognized principles of international law. Part IV
reviews the right to compensation under international law by first examin-
ing the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and non-gov-
ernmental bodies that have supported this principle and then reviewing
the State practice in this area. This Article concludes that while the right of
refugees to compensation and the corresponding obligation of the state of
origin might exist in theory, there is currently insufficient State practice to
support them, as the vast majority of implementation efforts have been
unsuccessful. The implementation of the right to compensation provided
by the Bosnian Government could, therefore, serve as an important prece-
dent under international law where the right to compensation is not only
articulated but enforced as well.
I. "Ethnic Cleansing" and Then What?
A. "Ethnic Cleansing" - The Destruction of Homes
Unfortunately, "ethnic cleansing" - the elimination by the dominant eth-
nic group of a given territory of members of other ethnic groups - has
proven to be the "enduring lexicographical legacy of the Yugoslav war."18
The practice of "ethnic cleansing" involves "a variety of methods with the
aim to expel, including harassment, discrimination, beatings, torture, rape,
summary executions, relocation of populations by force, confiscation of
property and destruction of homes and places of worship and cultural
institutions." 19
Nearly four years of "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia led to massive reloca-
tions of population and a concentration of each of the three ethnic groups
in their respective centers of habitation.20 As a result, the multi-ethnic
18. SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 6, at 244.
19. DEP'T OF PUB. INFORMATION, U.N., THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SITUATION IN THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 65-66 (1995) [hereinafter U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFORMATION]. See also
Petrovic, supra note 15.
20. Three broad categories of population movements took place during the war: (1)
"spontaneous flight," resulting from direct and indirect methods inducing people to
leave, (2) "organized transfers and deportations of populations," and (3) "exchanges of
persons and property." Christa Meindersma, Population Exchanges: International Law
Vol. 33
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character of pre-war Bosnia was shattered.2 1 Hundreds of thousands of
Bosnian citizens of all three ethnicities were forced from their homes
through different techniques of violence and intimidation that generally
had the actual or tacit approval of authorities. 2 2 Confiscation of property
and the razing of homes and farms to the ground were carried out to pre-
clude the possibility of return.23 A recurring practice was to force all civil-
ian inhabitants who sought to flee from the violence to surrender all future
rights to property. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the former
Yugoslavia, in his August 1992 report, describes how Bosnian-Serb soldiers
"ethnically-cleansed" the Bosniak majority town of Bosanska Dubica. After
the initial acts of murder, violence, discrimination, and harassment of the
local Muslim population,
Muslims who wanted to leave the village were allowed to do so only together
with their entire family .... Before those willing to leave were permitted to
do so, they were forced to sign documents stating that they would never
come back. No reference was made in those documents to their ... houses
[in the village] .... [T]hey could either sell them at a ridiculous price or give
the keys to the municipality for the duration of their absence, which after
they had signed the above-mentioned documents, was supposedly forever. 24
and State Practice - Part 2, 9 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 613, 615 (1997) [hereinafter Meinder-
sma-Part 21.
21. According to the 1991 census, Bosnia had a total population of just under 4.4
million, broken down by ethnicity as follows: 43% Bosniak, 31% Serb, 17% Croat, and
8% other. See Marcus Cox, Return, Relocation and Property Rights, a discussion paper 3
(Dec. 1997) [hereinafter Cox Report].
The ethnic groups were broadly distributed in each region. Whereas the rural villages
and hamlets were often dominated by one ethnic group, urban areas were generally eth-
nically mixed. In fact, 30-40% of all marriages in urban areas in Bosnia were mixed
marriages. See ROBERT DONIA & JOHN V.A. FINE, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: A TRADITION
BETRAYED 9 (1994).
UNHCR published rough figures which illustrate how dramatic the population shifts
were. Before the war there were 301,641 Muslims and Croats in the eastern Bosnian and
southern Herzegovina region, excluding Gorazde. By the end of 1995 this number had
shrunk to an estimated 4000. Similarly, the pre-war Muslim population of Tuzla of
316,000 more than doubled to 659,000. In contrast, the pre-war Serbian population of
Zenica, which was 79,355, fell to 16,000 and Tuzla's Serb population plummeted from
82,235 to an estimated 15,000. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Information
Notes on Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 1995, No. 12/95, at 8 [hereinafter UNHCR Information
Notes]; TIM JUDAH, THE SERBS: HISTORY, MYTH & THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA 291
(1997).
At the end of 1997, there were overwhelming ethnic majorities in all parts of Bosnia,
with the highest minority ratios at about 13% in the Tuzla-Podrinje and Sarajevo can-
tons. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Statistics Package: December 1, 1997.
22. See ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, MISSION TO BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA, SPECIAL REPORT: MUSICAL CHAIRS - PROPERTY PROBLEMS IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA 9 (July 1996). Most human rights organizations concluded that although
the Bosniak extremists did commit ethnic-based atrocities and evictions, the Bosniak-
dominated Bosnian Government did not engage in systematic "ethnic cleansing." See id.
23. See Report on The Situation in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia to the 47th
Session of the Security Council and the General Assembly, 1 6, U.N. Doc. A/47/666, S/
24809 (1992).
24. Report on The Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9 (1992).
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The effects of nearly four years of "ethnic cleansing" were devastating.
Not only were many homes abandoned or emptied, but it is estimated that
63% of all housing units were partially damaged and that 18% of all units
were destroyed. 25 Moreover, 90% of the pre-war Bosnian-Serb population
left the area now called the Federation and over 95% of the pre-war Bos-
nian-Croat and Muslim inhabitants fled what would become the Republika
Srpska (the RS) during this period. According to one estimate, only 2.8
million people, or 64% of the pre-war total, remained in Bosnia following
the exodus of refugees. 26 If one includes those internally displaced during
the conflict, then only 42% of the people remained in their home of origin
following the end of the war.27 Thus, since the war ended over four years
ago, some 2.2 million people have had to decide whether to return to their
pre-war home or resettle in another part of Bosnia or the world.
25. See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT, FRAMEwORK
REPORT TO FACILITATE THE LAUNCHING OF THE COMMISSION STIPULATED IN ANNEX SEVEN
CHAPTER Two OF THE DAYTON AGREEMENTS 1 82 (1996) [hereinafter ICMPD REPORT]. See
also INTERNATIONAL MGMT. GROUP, A DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR A PRELIMINARY APPROACH TO THE
RETURN AND RELOCATION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
(1997) (estimating that in the Federation approximately 50% of all housing units were
damaged during the war, with an additional 6% destroyed; whereas, in the RS, approxi-
mately 24% were damaged and an additional 5% were destroyed).
Prior to the war, Bosnia's 4.4 million people were "housed in an estimated 1,295,000
units or approximately the same as the total number of households." THE WORLD BANK,
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: EMERGENCY HOUSING REPAIR PROJECT - Technical Annex 1
(July 1996) (copy on file with author).
26. This includes 20,000 to 80,000 Bosnian Serbs who fled or were forced to leave
the suburbs of Sarajevo when these were transferred from the RS to the Federation in the
early spring of 1996. The DPA provided that authority over five Sarajevo suburbs would
pass from the Republika Srpska to the Federation by March 19, 1996. DPA, supra note
8, Annex 1A, art. 4. Forty-five days after the transfer of authority from the U.N. Protec-
tion Force [UNPROFOR] to the NATO-Ied Implementation Force [IFOR], the two entities
were to establish legal authority over the territory allotted to them by Annex IA. For the
Federation, this included gaining control over Sarajevo. During the months preceding
the transfer, however, both sides fell well short of implementing the confidence building
measures that would have allowed the transition to have occurred smoothly.
Despite painstaking preparations, the orderly transfer of authority broke down
when local police abandoned their neighborhoods, first to Serb thugs who
forced evictions, carted off industrial equipment, and torched buildings, then to
Bosnia[k] gangs who ransacked properties in advance of the arrival of the new
police. When the dust settled, most of the Serbs had fled.
Schear, supra note 7, at 93. See also Report on The Situation in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia, at 9 36, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996 (1996). Such actions went largely unop-
posed by either the U.N.'s civilian police monitors or IFOR. Schear, supra note 7, at 93.
27. See id. According to estimates, 540,000 or 39% of all Bosnian Serbs, 490,000 or
67% of Bosnian Croats, and 1,270,000 or 63% of Bosniaks were dislocated due to the
war. ICMPD REPORT, supra note 25, at 1 81.
Today, within the Federation, in six of the 10 cantons, ethnic minorities represent less
than 10% of the population, and in the remaining cantons, local regions show a similar
degree of ethnic separation. These figures are based on municipal registration figures
provided to UNHCR by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation Institute of Statistics in
Sarajevo, but are not completely accurate due to discrepancies in the registration pro-
cess. See U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, REGISTRATION OF REPATRIATES IN THE
FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND ENTITLEMENT TO FOOD ASSISTANCE AND MEDI-
CAL CARE (1997).
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B. Return vs. Relocation
Apart from stopping the fighting, the clearest promise of the DPA was that
2.2 million Bosnian refugees and displaced persons could return home and
Bosnia would be reconstructed as a single, multiethnic country.28 Thus, in
the post-DPA period, the international community has aggressively sought
to promote the mass return of the dislocated in the face of significant dem-
ographic changes that resulted from the war. The millions of dollars in
international support for numerous programs aimed at enabling the refu-
gees and displaced persons to return to their pre-war homes, however, have
produced disappointing results. 29
The large-scale voluntary return movements that the international
community anticipated would take place after the war simply have not
occurred.30 Of the over 1.2 million refugees at the end of the war, only
28. According to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the chief U.S. negotiator at
Dayton,
Dayton was not the creation of two different countries inside Bosnia. It's one
country with [the] rights of refugees to return... a single, central government
and a merger of two hostile forces, the Serbs, and the Croats and Muslims....
This is going to be one country. If it isn't, then we will have failed.
Stephen S. Rosenfeld, Residue of Ethnic Cleansing, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1995, at A27.
The International Commission on the Balkans, however, reporting shortly after the
signing of the DPA, concluded that "the term 'multi-ethnic' has been overused and sim-
plistically praised by Western commentators on Bosnia." ASPEN INs-nTrr BERLIN AND
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, UNFINISHED PEACE: REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BALKANS 84-85 (1996) [hereinafter UNFINISHED
PEACE]. As the international community helps to rebuild Bosnia and implement the
DPA, it should avoid "judging multi-ethnicity in post-war Bosnia by prewar norms [such
as] the 1991 distribution of the population.... What might be established, and must be
encouraged, are public norms and institutions that are not dominated by ethnicity." Id.
29. According to one Bosnia analyst, "[dlespite the almost bewildering array of ini-
tiatives and pilot projects, many of which are aimed at encouraging the return of ethnic
minorities, the process of knitting Bosnia together has barely begun." Bosco, supra note
7, at 68.
The international community has already spent well over one billion dollars in its
efforts to recreate a multi-ethnic society. The Reconstruction and Return Task Force
(RRTF) estimated the 1998 financial requirements for assisting the reintegration of dis-
placed persons in Bosnia at $520 million. See Reconstruction and Return Task Force,
Office of the High Representative, An Action Plan in Support of the Return of Refugees and
Displaced Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mar. 1998) (visited Apr. 26, 1999) <http://
www.ohr.int/rrft/9803-01.htm> [hereinafter RRFT March 1998 Action Plan].
The Office of the High Representative (OHR) established the RRTF inJanuary 1997 as
a forum for coordination. The RRTF is chaired by the OHR and is made up of the
UNHCR, the European Commission including the European Community Humanitarian
Office, the CRPC, the World Bank, the International Management Group, the U.N. Inter-
national Police Task Force, the Stabilization Force (SFOR), the U.N. Development Pro-
gramme, the International Organization for Migration, the U.S. Government, and
Germany's Federal Commissioner for Refugee Return and Related Reconstruction. For
recent statistics, see, for example, International Crisis Group, Minority Return or Mass
Relocation? (visited Apr. 26, 1999) <http://www.inl-crisis-group.org> [hereinafter ICG
Report, Mass Relocation?].
30. Critics of the DPA contend that the goal of recreating a multi-ethnic Bosnia,
through the mass return of refugees and displaced person, cannot be achieved and that
the United States should accept, if not encourage, the partition of Bosnia along ethnic
lines. They believe that the DPA's political provisions, for example, giving refugees and
displaced persons the right of return, will never be implemented. See HoLBRooKE, supra
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208,000 had returned to Bosnia by the end of 1997, and generally not to
their pre-war homes.3 1 Another 504,000 had acquired permanent status
abroad,3 2 leaving some 612,000 refugees without a permanent home of
their own.3 3 Finally, "by the end of 1997, only 45,000 Bosnians had
returned to areas in which they formed a minority, of whom a paltry 2200
had returned to the Republika Srpska."3 4 Most of the remaining refugees
and displaced persons originate from areas now under control of another
ethnic group and fear being persecuted and harassed if they attempt to
return to their pre-war home.3 5 Despite a number of different initiatives
orchestrated by the international community in the three years since Day-
ton,3 6 "minority returns" have continued to be anecdotal.3 7 All three eth-
note 8, at 363. One commentator writes that the "aspiration to achieve a truly reunified
and multiethnic Bosnia must be recognized as unrealistic," pointing to the fact that after
more than two years of trying to reverse "ethnic cleansing," only a small percentage of
displaced persons have returned to their pre-war homes. Michael O'Hanlon, Turning the
Bosnia Ceasefire into Peace, BROOIGNGs REV., Winter 1998, at 41, 42.
31. See, e.g., ICG Report, Mass Relocation?, supra note 29, at 3.
32. Of the Bosnians who have attained permanent status, 178,748 are in Croatia,
125,000 in Germany, 74,740 in Austria, 64,000 in the United States, 58,400 in Sweden,
47,578 in Canada, 27,500 in Slovenia, 26,300 in Australia, 21,421 in Denmark, 18,440
in the Netherlands, 12,885 in Norway, and 12,449 in Switzerland. See U.N. HIGH COM-
MISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, REPATRIATION AND RETURN OPERATION 1998 (1997), at 9.
33. According to UNHCR, four "durable" or "sustainable" solutions are available to
the dislocated: (1) voluntary return to the pre-conflict home; (2) local integration in a
country of asylum; (3) resettlement and (4) relocation, i.e., where refugees settle in their
country of origin in a location other than their pre-conflict home. U.N. HIGH COMMIS.
SIONER FOR REFUGEES, A REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABLE RETURN ON THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVI 3.4 (1998) [hereinafter UNCHR REGIONAL STRATEGY].
34. ICG Report, Mass Relocation?, supra note 29.
35. Many were part of the majority ethnic group at their pre-war home before the war
erupted. Whereas "majority returnees," those returning who are members of the current
majority ethnic group at their place of origin, face typical problems in a post-war situa-
tion, such as damage to housing and infrastructure, scarcity of jobs, and war-related
psychological trauma. "Minority returnees," those returning who are members of the
current minority ethnic group at their place of origin, in addition to these difficulties,
generally have to contend with hostility, harassment, and all of the different forms of
discrimination that result from being the "other" in a political environment still being
fueled by virulent nationalism. See International Crisis Group, ICG Report: Going
Nowhere Fast (visited Apr. 26, 1999) <http://www.ind-crisis-group.org/projects/bosnia/
reports/bh22repl.htm>. Displaced persons who have relocated to a majority area feel
particularly threatened, as they fear being displaced again by the return of the pre-war
inhabitants. See Cox, Strategic Approaches, supra note 17, at 24-30.
36. For a discussion of the different initiatives, see, for example, ICG Report, Mass
Relocation?, supra note 29, at 13-30; UNCHR REGIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 33, § 7;
Cox, The Right to Return, supra note 13, at 623-26.
37. Some would argue that this was to be expected. For example, one observer, writ-
ing before the peace agreement was concluded, noted:
[wlhile it may be a lamentable comment on the human condition, the fact is that
population flows that increase ethnic homogeneity [as did those during the Bos-
nian war] are much less likely to be reversed than those that create greater [eth-
nic] heterogeneity. In other words, repatriation is more likely with refugees who
belong to the dominant ethnic group ... of the state of origin than with those
belonging to a minority.
Alan Dowty, Return or Compensation: Legal and Political Context of Palestinian Refugee
Issues, 1994 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 26, 29 (1994).
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nic groups continue to oppose large-scale "minority return" largely because
they fear losing control of territory gained or successfully defended during
the war. Thus, in most cantons, international pressure has induced such
returns in only one or two municipalities. 38 In fact, the number of returns
fell from 250,000 in 1996 to 150,000 in 1997 - a 40% drop - and returns
of displaced persons dropped from 160,000 to 50,000.3 9 These numbers
suggest "that most displaced persons who were able and willing to go home
have already done so, and that movements of displaced persons could
therefore remain limited in 1998"40 and beyond, at least so long as minor-
ity return continues to be opposed.
The international community's lack of success in its efforts to induce
those dislocated during and in the aftermath of the war to return can be
attributed to administrative, economic, psychological, and physical factors.
These include harassment and intimidation of minority groups, systematic
violation of property rights, a shortage of housing and inappropriate distri-
bution of housing stocks, legal and bureaucratic obstacles to return, and a
severe lack of economic activity and employment opportunities. In addi-
tion, many potential returnees remain ambivalent about returning because
of the continued presence of war criminals in Bosnia who were indicted by
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, i.e., those
responsible for directing and/or carrying out much of the "ethnic cleans-
38. See RRTF March 1998 Action Plan, supra note 29, 1 7.
39. "An analysis of returns by entity and canton is revealing. For example, nearly
37,000 internally displaced persons returned to Una-Sana Canton in 1996, but only 250
in 1997, a more than 99 percent drop." U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, 1998 WORLD
REFUGEE SURVEY 164 (1998). This same Canton, however, was "second only to Sarajevo
as the destination for repatriating refugees in 1997 (and recorded virtually the same
number of returns in both 1996 and 1997 - about 23,500 each year). This could sug-
gest that significantly more repatriating refugees were relocating rather than returning
to their original homes." Id.
In Sarajevo Canton, "authorities had registered 2,556 Serbs as returning to [Bosniak
dominated] Sarajevo . . . [however], [m]any of those registered as returnees had not
actually returned ... and persons returning to Sarajevo did not necessarily stay there."
Id. Serbs and Croats "sometimes returned to test the waters or to re-establish property
claims without intending to return permanently." Id. The CRPC has concluded that a
"significant portion of the 19,000 persons who registered property claims in Sarajevo
Canton were more interested in establishing ownership claims in order to sell or trade
property than in returning." Id. at 164-65. See also Interview with Steven Segal, Execu-
tive Officer, CRPC (Oct. 20, 1998) (copy on file with author).
40. RRTF March 1998 Action Plan, supra note 29, at q 6. Minority returns for the
first half of 1998 have been slower than expected. Between 11,000 to 15,000 have
returned, which is well below the UNHCR target figure of 50,000. See Report of the High
Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to the Secretary General of the
United Nations (July 14, 1998) (visited Apr. 26, 1999) <http://www.ohr.int/reports/
r987014a.htm)>.
Generally, majority ethnic groups have tolerated minority return to rural areas lacking
economic viability, or, for small numbers of returnees, to large urban areas, provided
that they do not displace members of the majority group. See Letter from Arthur Helton,
Director, Open Society Institute/Forced Migration Project, to Sadako Ogata, U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees 4 (Oct. 16, 1998) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter
Helton Letter].
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ing."4 1 These barriers have left the dislocated population fearful and
uncertain as they decide whether to attempt to return.
Even if all of these obstacles were removed, a significant portion of the
dislocated community would still prefer to relocate permanently. There
are a number of explanations for this phenomenon. First, for many survi-
vors of the "ethnic cleansing," the scars left by acts of violence - assassina-
tion, murder, rape, torture, burning and looting - that drove them from
their homes run so deep that their return to the scene of the crime is
unlikely. Indeed, even to expect their return is "unconscionable."4 2 One
can hardly assume that the "traumatized torture victims and women survi-
vors of the 'ethnic cleansing' in Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka, and other
communities [would wish to] return to areas controlled by the very forces
who victimized them."43 For these people, permanent relocation is their
desired solution to the displacement.
This interest among Bosnians in resettlement is also due to certain
population movements in Bosnia that the war simply hastened, but did not
precipitate. It is unlikely that these demographic changes can be reversed.
One resulted from the urbanization of the region that began prior to the
outbreak of the war, in patterns similar to those of other Central European
countries.4 4 The war merely accelerated this movement, as it caused a sig-
nificant number of rural inhabitants to move to the cities, many of whom
have since become accustomed to urban standards of living.45 A majority
of these former village dwellers have no desire to return to economically
desolate rural areas after having spent the war living in urban centers.46
41. For a discussion of these obstacles to return and the international community's
efforts to remove them, see, for example, UNHCR REGIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 33, at
2; OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATAIVE, REPORT OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR IMPLE-
MENTATION OF THE BOSNIAN PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF HE UNITED
NATIONS (1998); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, RIGHTING THE WRONGS, RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS FOR 1998 (1998).
42. Protecting the Rights of Refugees and the Internally Displaced Victims of Violence in
the Former Yugoslavia in any Potential Peace Agreement on Human Rights Before the House
Committee on International Relations, 104th Cong. at 32 (Nov. 15, 1995) (prepared state-
ment by Robert P. DeVecchi, President, International Rescue Committee). See also
Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina All the Way Home: Safe "Minority Returns" as
a Just Remedy and for a Secure Future 35, Feb. 1998, Al Index: EUR 63/02/98.
43. U.S. COMMIrEE FOR REFUGEES, 1997 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 54 (1997).
44. Between 1986 and 1991, a large number of people moved from the countryside
to the cities. This trend is mirrored in other Central and Eastern European countries.
For example, in the Czech Republic rural employment has declined by 40% since 1989.
See RRTF March 1998 Action Plan, supra note 29, 1 13.
45. In most of the larger towns and cities in post-war Bosnia, "there is a pattern of
relocation from surrounding villages into the town center[s]." Cox Report, supra note 21,
at 11. Many villagers sought refuge in the towns during the war, and their homes have
been damaged or destroyed. See id. "There are increasing signs that many of them do
not want to return to their villages, even when there is no security impediment." Id.
46. The RRTF has observed that people have not returned to areas where there are
few economic prospects. "Many families have not returned to remote villages, (even
after their houses have been repaired with international assistance)." RRTF March 1998
Action Plan, supra note 29, 1 16. Moreover, the "social and economic structures which
sustained many rural communities under the socialist system have disappeared." Cox,
Strategic Approaches, supra note 17, at 36.
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This is particularly the case for younger people. 47 The second is the result
of the substantial economic reform process that Bosnia began before war
erupted in the spring of 1992, as it moved from a planned to a market
economy. Labor migration is the natural result of this shift, as new eco-
nomic centers emerge, unprofitable enterprises dose, and people are there-
fore forced to move where there are jobs. In Bosnia today, the distribution
of employment opportunities is changing rapidly and this has generated
and will continue to generate the migration of a significant element of the
labor force.4 8
The removal of the barriers to return that nationalist leaders have
erected, therefore, are likely to have little impact on the desire of these peo-
ple to return to their pre-war homes.4 9 "Minority return" programs are
Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic noted:
many of the refugees who poured into Sarajevo have [no] motive to leave..
"they are peasants and farmers. Many of these people came from villages with-
out shops [and] medical care.... They end up [in Sarajevo]. This is what they
have dreamed of. Okay, so they didn't want to have a war, but now they are
here. Why go back?"
Marilyn Henry, Back to Bosnia, JERUSALEM Posr, Sept. 11, 1998, at 19.
In addition, many of the refugees who have returned to Bosnia from abroad have very
different life expectations than they had when they fled. The International Commission
on the Balkans, reporting in the immediate aftermath of the war, predicted this phenom-
ena, noting that "refugees in... the West are unlikely to return in large numbers. They
are likely to go back only on a modest scale, and only to where they will be in an ethnic
majority and where economic conditions permit.... [This would be the case] even
under the most optimistic scenarios for refugee return." UNmINIsHED PEACE, supra note
28, at 100-01. Thus, the Commission concluded that "most refugees will remain in the
West." Id. at 101.
47. There was nearly a consensus among the participants in a study commissioned
by the World Bank that only the older people will return to live in the villages and most
predicted that no more than 15% of the people would return from the cities to their pre-
war village homes. A young woman from Vitzez, supporting this sentiment, noted that
"even before the war, younger people were leaving the villages en masse." WORLD BANK,
SOCIAL ASSEssMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE WAR IN BosNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1998) [here-
inafter WORLD BANK, SocIAL AssEssMENT]. Younger people of all ethnic groups surveyed
cited the poor living conditions, poor communications links with urban centers, dis-
tance to schools and hospitals, and the government's inability to subsidize the social
infrastructure in the villages as reasons why they would not choose to return to their
rural pre-war homes.
48. For example, "[a] number of pre-war large enterprises are likely to be restruc-
tured (e.g., Zenica steel plant), and new businesses are already emerging in many places
(e.g., Tuzla)." RRTF March 1998 Action Plan, supra note 29, ' 13. Moreover,
"[i]ndustries which once supported entire cities are now defunct." Cox, Strategic
Approaches, supra note 17, at 36.
In a recent report on Bosnia, the UNHCR has acknowledged the significance of the
various pre-war and wartime demographic changes experienced in that region, noting
that "[n]ot all populations displaced by conflict return to their homes following the end
of hostilities. In addition to pre-conflict migration patters, new patterns result from the
social and economic upheaval stemming from conflict, the region's transition to a mar-
ket economy and other phenomena such as the move of rural populations to urban
areas." UNHCR REGIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 33, 1 3.4.
49. According to the OHR, four hurdles must be overcome for the process of minor-
ity return to become significant and self-sustaining: (1) the international community
must press for an immediate and firm commitment of the leadership at both the State
and Entity level, which must then be translated into consistent and prompt administra-
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unlikely to reverse these population movements.50 The Reconstruction
and Return Task Force (RRTF) reached this conclusion in its March 1998
report, stating that the international community will only be able to
reverse those population movements that would not have occurred absent
war in Bosnia, i.e., of people who were expelled or had to abandon their
homes as a result of the "ethnic cleansing."5 1 The report recognized that
the RRTF will have limited success in reversing urbanization trends and
transition-related movements that are not significantly different from those
that occurred in other post-communist Central European countries. 52
The numerous remaining obstacles to large-scale "minority return," as
well as the existence of a significant number of people who will not return
even if these obstacles are removed, has led many observers in Bosnia to
conclude that relocation is a reality that the international community must
recognize. 53 The limited results of the various return initiatives have
tive and legislative action at all levels; (2) the security of returning refugees must be
assured and the concept of a multi-ethnic police force must become a reality; (3) the lack
of adequate housing must be addressed; and (4) a new property market and legislative
framework must be instituted to allow all citizens effectively to exercise their property
rights. See HIGH REPRESENTATIvE TO THE STEERING BOARD, REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 3 (1998) [hereinafter Implemen-
tation Report].
Providing all refugees and displaced persons with a fair opportunity to sell, lease, or
exchange their property, would be a positive step in the development of a real estate
market. Moreover, it would enhance the ability of refugees and displaced persons to
choose how to exercise their property rights.
50. The most significant program, in terms of resources, is the Open Cities Initiative,
jointly sponsored by UNHCR and the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Population
Refugees and Migration. In March 1997, UNHCR announced the Open Cities Initiative,
which represented a commitment to reward those local communities that demonstrated
an openness to minority returns with increased international assistance. According to
the International Crisis Group, as of April 1998, $60 million has been committed to
Open Cities. International Crisis Group, The Konjic Conundrum: Why Minorities Have
Failed to Return to Model Open City (visited Apr. 26, 1998) <http://www.intl-crisis-
group.org>. While 1790 minorities have returned to these cities since the signing of the
DPA, only 582 of them returned after their recognition as Open Cities. ICG Report,
Mass Relocation?, supra note 29, at 3.A.1. The Open Society Institute has calculated a
cost of $80,750 per returnee under the Open Cities Initiative and accurately noted that
such a program, even if expanded, could not be maintained. Helton Letter, supra note
40, at 2.
Other efforts to encourage return include UNHCR's Pilot Projects in the Federation,
the Sarajevo Housing Commission established by the Sarajevo Declaration of February
1998. Under these programs, specific individuals seeking to return to their homes are
identified, and local authorities are pressured to accept their return.
51. RRTF March 1998 Action Plan, supra note 29, Cl 14.
52. See id. According to the World Bank sponsored survey, when asked how many
displaced persons will return from the city to the village, a common number given was
15%. All three ethnic groups surveyed were in agreement that it will only be the older
people who will return to the villages to live, mainly because of emotional ties to their
property. WORLD BANK, SocIAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 47, at 47.
53. "Relocation" describes the situation when repatriating refugees and displaced
persons end up in places that are not their homes of origin. See RECONSTRUcTION AND
RETURN TAsK FORCE, OHR. OUTLOOK FOR 1998 - "RESOURCES, REPATRIATION AND MINOR-
rrY RETURN" 1 34 (1997). Both UNHCR and the PIC Steering Board have recently voiced
their support for relocation so long that it is truly voluntary, although return should
remain as the preferred solution. Both agree, however, that resettlement should not be
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demonstrated not only the "difficulty of securing compliance by recalci-
trant local officials," but also "the limitations of the international commu-
nity in assuming the management of such processes."5 4 Simply put, the
international community lacks the ability to directly reverse "ethnic deans-
ing."55 At least 50% of repatriating refugees, particularly to the Bosniak
areas of the Federation, have chosen to relocate.56 Those who wish to
return, but cannot, due to political and security reasons, are increasingly
settling down in new areas, rather than waiting and hoping for the climate
to change. In fact, even if the myriad minority return programs were to
exceed the expectations of the international community, there is a practical
limit in the number of people that can be expected to return. Moreover, the
existing minority return strategies have yet to suggest any way of returning
minorities to properties that are currently occupied by other displaced
persons. 57
encouraged where it occurs as a result of official local manipulation and intimidation.
Since relocation may be promoted for a political objective, i.e., by nationalist political
leaders who want to solidify gains made during and in the aftermath of the war, UNHCR
has stated that for relocation to be acceptable, it "must respect the property rights of
others, be voluntary and based on an informed choice as to the desired place of resi-
dence, whether newly built or existing accommodation." UNHCR REGIONAL STRATEGY,
supra note 33, J 7.9.
A survey conducted by the CRPC and UNHCR cites three factors that suggest that
relocation is an important part of the search for durable solutions for those forced to
flee their homes during the war. First, given "[t]he progress and pattern of return so
far.., it is unrealistic to expect a complete return of the population shifts that took
place during the war and thus a full return of all refugees and displaced persons to their
pre-war homes." Second, "there is an important minority [of displaced persons and refu-
gees] who do not wish to return" to their pre-war homes. Third, as the result of eco-
nomic factors, "many areas of [Bosnia] will no longer be able to sustain their pre-war
populations." Cox Report, supra note 21, at 22.
See also UNHCR REPATRIATION AND RETuRN OPERATION 1998, infra note 56, at 5 (noting
that population relocation will be an essential component of the search for durable solu-
tions for refugees and displaced persons and it may be supported provided that it is
voluntary and does not diminish prospects for return). Despite recognizing the reality
of relocation, in November 1998, a UNHCR representative in Sarajevo stated that, except
for a small-scale integration program for Bosnian-Serbs and Croats in Serbia, UNHCR
would not provide support for relocation in 1999.
54. Helton Letter, supra note 40, at 2.
55. Cox, The Right to Return, supra note 13, at 600.
56. See RRTF March 1998 Action Plan, supra note 29, cl 6. UNHCR reports that "an
estimated 70% of repatriation in the second half of 1997 can be characterized as reloca-
tion." UNHCR REPATRIATION AND RETuRN OPERATION 3 (1998).
Recent CRPC surveys have revealed that a significant number of people have deter-
mined that they cannot or will not return - they would rather relocate. See Cox Report,
supra note 21, at 12-19.
57. The destruction of property and the massive population movements that
occurred during the war led to severe housing problems. In order to accommodate the
influx of internally displaced people into the urban areas, and to increase their power by
controlling access to housing so as to distribute it for political gain to supporters, local
authorities seized many of the dwellings left empty. In these homes they placed dis-
placed persons from their own ethnic group who had been driven from or fled their pre-
war homes. Almost everywhere throughout Bosnia, houses of people who left during the
war (ethnic minorities in particular) are used to house displaced persons.
According to the 1996 Census of Refugees and Displaced Persons In the RS, about half
of the displaced persons in the RS were living in abandoned housing either illegally or
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The drafters of Annex Seven envisioned that some dislocated by the
war would not want to return to their pre-war home, but would rather pre-
fer to resettle. Thus, in lieu of return, the dislocated were provided with the
right to receive compensation for their homes.
II. The Right to Compensation in Bosnia
A. Annex Seven and the International Response
The international community viewed the right of all refugees and displaced
persons to return to their homes as fundamental to any peace agreement in
Bosnia.58 The right to compensation, however, was not simply a creation
of the U.S. Department of State lawyers who drafted Annex Seven. Instead,
it was also a seminal element of many of the international community's
proposals designed to bring peace to Bosnia.
The requirements for permitting the return of refugees and displaced
persons and the return of or compensation for property were first included
in the Statement on Bosnia by the London Conference held in the summer
of 1992.59 A peace plan formulated by the ICFY the following year pro-
vided refugees and displaced persons with the alternative rights of
returning home or receiving compensation for lost property.60 During the
war, the General Assembly expressed its support for both of these rights.6 1
with temporary occupancy rights granted by the local authorities. Refugees and dis-
placed persons, therefore, cannot return to their homes without evicting others. Evic-
tion, however, is almost impossible in the absence of an alternative solution for the
occupants. Thus, none of the more than 15,000 people holding CRPC certificates,
which certify their ownership or occupancy rights to their pre-war homes have actually
been able to return and have the temporary occupant, generally of the majority ethnic-
ity, removed. See RECONSTRUCTION AND RETuRN TASK FORCE, ASSISTING REINTEGRATION, AN
ACTION PLAN IN SUPPORT OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
32-33 (1998) (copy on file with author).
58. See, e.g., UNCHR REGIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 33; ICG Report, Mass Reloca-
tion?, supra note 29; RRTF March 1998 Action Plan, supra note 29.
59. The London Conference, convened a few months after war spread to Bosnia,
was, at that time, the most ambitious international summit on Bosnia. The Conference
established the requirements for acknowledging the right of all refugees and displaced
persons to return or to receive compensation for their property should they choose not to do
so. See Szasz, infra note 83, at 312. For the complete set of documents adopted at the
Conference, see 31 I.L.M. 1531 (1992).
This Conference, co-sponsored by the British and the U.N., was attended by more
than 30 countries and organizations. It also established the International Conference
on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) (initially known as the "Vance-Owen Negotiations"
after the then Co-Chairmen of the ICFY Steering Committee: Cyrus Vance and David
Owen), with a working group on Bosnia and Herzegovina.
60. The Invincible Plan, was negotiated during the summer of 1993, culminating on
September 20, with a final negotiating session on the British carrier HMS Invincible. It
laid out a fully articulated Constitutional Agreement of the Union of Bosnia and Herze-
govina and a set of Agreed Arrangements, both of which contained extensive procedural
and substantive human rights provisions. The parties quickly rejected the plan, how-
ever, largely because of territorial disputes. The final Invincible Plan appears in B.G.
RAMCHARAN, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: OFICIAL
PAPERS 275-329 (1997).
61. See, e.g., Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), G.A.
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Furthermore, in the Basic Principles affirmed in Geneva on August 8,
1995, which formed the foundation for the discussions at Dayton, the par-
ties "agreed ... to enable displaced persons to repossess their homes or
receive just compensation."6 2 Finally, in his remarks at the initialing of the
DPA, then Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that "refugees and
displaced persons will have the right to return home or to obtain just
compensation." 63
All of the efforts of the international community culminated in Annex
Seven of the DPA, which provides that
[aill refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their
home of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property
of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be
compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them.64
Although according to Annex Seven, Article I, compensation was only to be
made available to those whose pre-war property could not be restored to
them, Article XII(5) affords all refugees and displaced persons the choice
between return and compensation, providing that the owner has the right
to compensation in lieu of return. "Whenever refugees or displaced per-
sons could not envisage returning home, inter alia, because they continued
to fear ethnic animosity, they should be entitled to just compensation." 65
In order to facilitate the implementation of both rights, Annex Seven
established the Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees, later
renamed the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons
and Refugees (CRPC), 6 6 ,to receive and decide claims of refugees and dis-
placed persons for real property and to award compensation to those who
choose not to return to their pre-war homes. 67 According to Article XII(5),
compensation may come in the form of a monetary award or a compensa-
Res. 49/196, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/196 (1995) (reaffirming
right of all persons to return to their homes and the "right of victims of ethnic cleansing
to receive just reparation for their losses").
62. Agreed Principles, Geneva, Sept. 8, 1995, at 301. The same principles were reaf-
firmed in the Further Agreed Basic Principles, adopted in New York, Sept. 26, 1995 (on
file with author).
63. CHRISTOPHER, supra note 1, at 366. Christopher titled this speech "Building
Peace with Justice."
64. DPA, supra note 8, Annex Seven, art. 1. The significance of the CRPC's overall
goal, the restoration of property rights, to the future political stability of Bosnia,
although beyond the scope of this article, has been discussed elsewhere. See Cox, The
Right to Return, supra note 13, at 605.
65. Hans van Houtte, The Property Claims Commission in Bosnia-Herzegovina - A
New Path to Restore Real Estate Rights in Post-War Societies?, in INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE 549, 550 (K. Wellens ed. 1998). Professor van Houtte has served as
one of the nine Commissioners of the Commission for Real Property Claims since its
inception in March 1996.
66. The change in name was to avoid confusion with UNHCR's mandate under the
DPA and to state more clearly the CRPC's mandate, i.e., to receive and decide property
claims.
67. Under Annex Seven, Art. XII(2), "[a]ny person requesting compensation in lieu
of return who is found by the Commission to be the lawful owner of that property shall
be awarded just compensation as determined by the Commission." DPA, supra note 8,
Annex Seven, art. XII(2). Compensation is to be payable for the value of the property
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tion bond for the future purchase of the real property.68 Funds for any
compensation awards could come from either grants from the interna-
tional community or the signatories of the DPA, or the proceeds from the
activities of the CRPC selling or leasing the properties it receives in
exchange for compensation awards.69 The Annex Seven Compensation
Plan has yet to become a reality. Neither the parties to the DPA, the Bos-
nian Government, nor the international community has provided the funds
necessary to operate such a program. 70 Thus, the CRPC claimants' choice
between return and compensation has essentially become a Hobson's
choice, - essentially no choice at all.7 1
The failure of the international community to implement the compen-
sation plan of Annex Seven stems from a concern that allowing displaced
persons to choose between compensation and return of property will
inhibit the re-creation of a multi-ethnic Bosnia and therefore undermine the
prior to April 1, 1992, or before the war, thus not taking into consideration any war
damage.
When completing a claim form, the refugee or displaced person is asked to indicate
which way he intends to exercise his property rights by choosing one of three options:
(1) "wishes to return into possession of claimed real property," (2) undecided, or (3)
wishes to receive some form of compensation for his property. Van Houtte, supra note
65, at 558-59.
68. Compensation would be drawn against a Refugees and Displaced Persons Prop-
erty Fund. See DPA, supra note 8, Annex Seven, art. XIV.
69. See DPA, supra note 8, Annex Seven, art. XII(5); art. XIV(1). According to Annex
Seven, the CRPC would gain title to any property for which it compensated a refugee or
displaced person.
One possibility that has attracted some attention is the idea of structuring the Prop-
erty Fund called for by Annex Seven as a mutual property fund and opening it to outside
investors. Claimants who chose not to hold on to their property, to which they cannot
or choose not to return - and who were unable to sell or exchange the property - could
sign over their properties to the Fund in return for shares. Although such mechanism is
not likely to appeal to those who are in a desperate condition and need either money or
housing immediately, those refugees who have resettled abroad, might be interested.
70. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text for an argument as to why the
Parties to Annex Seven should be responsible for providing the necessary funds.
There is some concern that Bosnian-Serb real estate agents in the RS have bought
properties at rock-bottom prices from Bosniak widows of Srebrenica (RS), who are des-
perate both to relocate in the Federation and receive some money to assist with this
relocation. Some members of international organizations in Sarajevo have described
these as "fire sales."
In September 1998, the Open Society Institute's Forced Migration Project, aware of
this phenomenon, urged the CRPC to "develop mechanisms to assess the value of real
property," "establish regulations for the compensation, lease, or exchange of property in
ways respectful of human rights," and "encourage political authorities to enact legisla-
tion which will regulate real estate transactions." FORCED MIGRATION MONITOR, Sept.
1998, at 5.
71. Amnesty International has criticized Annex Seven for failing to "expressly guar-
antee that refugees and displaced persons will be able to return and be compensated for
their houses where they were deliberately destroyed as punishment." Amnesty Interna-
tional, supra note 16, at II.A.5. Thus, they are left "with an unpalatable choice between
returning to their ruined houses without any compensation for the damage or not
returning, but obtaining compensation." Id.
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fundamental goal of the DPA.72 Critics of Annex Seven's compensation
plan first assert that the option of receiving compensation will deter refu-
gees from returning to their pre-war homes. They argue that a compensa-
tion option will provide the already reluctant refugees with yet another
reason to resettle.73 Second, critics argue that a compensation plan would
reward those groups who obstruct the return of displaced persons. Com-
pensation would cancel the pre-war owner's ownership rights,74 leaving
the temporary occupant, most likely a member of the majority ethnic group
in the region, in control of the property.75
Efforts to build support and raise the funds necessary to implement
the compensation plan of Annex Seven are severely hampered by the fact
that those local politicians who obstruct minority return tend to be the
most vocal supporters for giving people the option of compensation. 76 For
example, while in office, Momcio Krajisnik, the hard-line Serb representa-
tive of the joint Presidency, an outspoken critic of the DPA and its goal of a
unified Bosnia, stated that it was a mistake to insist on the return of refu-
gees and displaced persons, while ignoring the other Dayton remedy of
compensation. 77 Thus, the perception is that if the international commu-
nity were to facilitate the exercise of the right to compensation enunciated
in the DPA, it would weaken its efforts on minority returns, provide sup-
port for the nationalist leaders who are seeking to consolidate ethnic sepa-
ration, and "betraying the interests of the victims of ethnic cleansing who
are still determined to return."78 Yet, the international community's failure
to focus on implementing the right to compensation betrays the interests of
those victims who genuinely do not wish to return.79
72. See Interview with Lisa Jones, UNHCR Sarajevo Protection Officer (July 28,
1998) (on file with author).
73. See Van Houtte, supra note 65, at 559.
74. See DPA, supra note 8, Annex Seven, art. XII(5).
75. See Cox, The Right to Return, supra note 13, at 612.
76. The three ethnic groups have differing interpretations of the DPA: Serb authori-
ties have generally resisted measures that would lead to the return home of non-Serb
refugees or displaced persons. Instead, they strongly support compensation schemes for
individuals as well as exchanges of property. Bosniaks generally take the opposite posi-
tion, insisting on an unqualified right of return and opposing compensation, exchange
of property and perhaps even housing construction that could facilitate "relocation."
On these issues, the Croats' views are more like the Serbs' than the Bosniaks.
77. See Bosnian Serb Leader Says Predecessor Karadzic Will Withdraw "From the
Media," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 11, 1997, available on LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File. He sees compensation or exchange as a more practical alterna-
tive. Refugees and displaced persons, he argues, should have a choice, "[i]f the emphasis
is only placed on the return of refugees, confusion will ensue and we shall not be able to
solve refugees' problems." Id.
In June 1998, Miorad Dodik, the nearly moderate Prime Minister of the RS, advocated
offering refugees and displaced persons the option of receiving compensation for their
property in lieu of return. See Milorad Dodik, Property Commission Head Discuss Prop-
erty Returns, June 4, 1998 Report on Banja Luka Srpski Radio (copy on file with author).
78. Cox Report, supra note 21, at 29. See also ICG Report, Mass Relocation?, supra
note 29 (discussing how Bosnian-Croat and Serb nationalist parties are using relocation
for political purposes).
79. Given the obstacles to return that currently exist, some argue that relatively few
refugees and displaced persons are currently in a position to make a free and informed
Cornell International Law Journal
B. The Importance of Implementing the Right to Compensation
Implementation of the right to compensation would significantly benefit
dislocated persons who would not return even if much of the current
obstruction disappeared. For most refugees and displaced persons, the
property they lost during and in the aftermath of the war is their principal
or only asset. In fact, those who owned their pre-war homes likely invested
their earnings in the construction, expansion, and upkeep of the dwell-
ings.80 The opportunity to recover some of that value would enable them
to regain part of their substantial investment in their home, while signifi-
candy enhancing their ability to start life over in a new location. It would
give them "the means to solve their own displacement."'8 1
The obstacles to the exercise of Annex Seven compensation rights
might indeed have a negative impact on the prospect of long-term peace
and stability in the region. It could reinforce the discontent of the large
segment of the population that the international community ignored dur-
ing the war and continues to do after the cease-fire. Large groups of poor
and insecure displaced persons "are a major destabilising factor, contribut-
ing to the power of extremist politicians and retarding the process of ethnic
reintegration."8 2 The failure to implement the right to compensation pro-
choice regarding whether they wish to return. See, eg., UNHCR REGIONAL STRATEGY,
supra note 33, at 3; ICG Report, Mass Relocation?, supra note 29. Only when the obsta-
cles are removed so as to make the choice between return and relocation a free one, they
argue, should the international community begin to support the right to compensation.
See ICG Report, Mass Relocation?, supra note 29.
This argument, however, does not consider the thousands of displaced persons and
refugees who do not want to return, regardless of whether the obstruction is removed or
not. Moreover, it holds all of those interested in permanent relocation and compensa-
tion hostage to the international community's impracticable goal of large-scale minority
return. See Cox, The Right to Return, supra note 13, at 627-29.
80. Prior to the war, 80% of the residential property was privately owned, mainly in
the countryside. See RRTF March 1998 Action Plan, supra note 29, at 1144, Box 10. The
remaining 20% was "socially-owned", mainly in the cities, where public housing
accounted for about 1/2 of the housing stock. See id. Under practices of the SFRY, con-
struction of "socially-owned" apartments came from contributions of each working per-
son to the Housing Contribution Fund. ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN
EUROPE, supra note 22. These obligatory contributions could have amounted to as much
as 10% of total income. See id. Although every worker contributed to the fund, not
every family received occupancy rights to a socially-owned apartment. See id. Those
holding such rights in these socially-owned apartments were more than simply tenants,
but did not own their homes and were not allowed to buy them. See id. See also Jessica
Simor, Tackling Human Rights Abuses in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Convention Is up to
it, Are its Institutions? 1997 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 644, 653-54 (1997) (describing the
institution of socially-owned housing). An occupancy right has been referred to as
"quasi-ownership." OPEN SOCIETY INSTITTE FORCED MIGRATION PROJECT, PROPERTY Lav
IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 13 (1996).
81. Cox, Strategic Approaches, supra note 17, at 39. Facilitating the exercise of the
right to receive compensation for one's property would do more than simply provide
some assistance to the thousands of needy refugees and displaced persons who genu-
inely do not wish to return. Enabling the dislocated to exercise this Annex Seven right,
which likely would involve the sale, lease, or exchange of property, would provide refu-
gees with a fair opportunity to exercise their property rights and would assist the devel-
opment of a mature property market in Bosnia. See supra note 50.
82. See Cox, Strategic Approaches, supra note 17, at 41 (arguing that return to home
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vided by Annex Seven has left those who genuinely do not wish to return
without redress for the massive property rights violations that occurred
during and in the aftermath of the war. It would be ironic if many of Bos-
nia's citizens, the beneficiaries of an agreement that provides perhaps the
most comprehensive set of human rights principles in the world, were to be
left without any compensation for their loss of property.83
In addition to the direct assistance that the right to compensation
would provide refugees and displaced persons eager to resettle, compensa-
tion rights may not, in fact, be incompatible with the international commu-
nity's primary goal in Bosnia of establishing a multi-ethnic state. If
individuals received compensation or a sale price for property lost because
of the war it might generate local resources to assist with reintegration.
Compensation would assist refugees and displaced persons in their efforts
to find permanent accommodation in the area of resettlement. Currently,
the lack of such accommodation for nearly 40% of the population within
Bosnia makes displaced persons extremely vulnerable to manipulation by
nationalist political leaders who oppose minority returns.84 Moreover, if
the responsibility for providing funds for compensation were to fall on the
local governments, it might induce them to remove many of the obstacles to
return that currently exist.8 5 In such a case, they could no longer afford to
obstruct return. 6
of origin should continue to be the preferred solution, but is not likely to solve the
displacement crisis).
83. Under the DPA, Annex Four, article 11(1), the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina
are guaranteed "the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and funda-
mental freedoms." DPA, supra note 8, Annex Four, art. 1I(1). Bosnia is bound by 21
international human rights instruments as stipulated in both Annex Four (the Constitu-
tion) and Annex Six (Human Rights). See id. Annex Four also individually confers thir-
teen fundamental rights, including the right to property and the right to liberty of
movement and residence. See id. The DPA also established three national institutions to
deal with human rights issues. These are the Human Rights Chamber and the Human
Rights Ombudsman, established under Annex Six, and form together the Commission
on Human Rights and the CRPC. See id. The Annex Six bodies can consider alleged or
apparent violations of human rights by the authorities that occurred after December 14,
1995, i.e., the date the DPA entered into force. See id. For a thorough discussion of the
human rights protections contained in the DPA, see, for example, James Sloan, The Day-
ton Peace Agreement: Human Rights Guarantees and Their Implementation, 7 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 207 (1996); Paul C. Szasz, Current Developments: The Protection- of Human Rights
Through the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement on Bosnia, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 301 (1996). See
also Report on The Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia III
21-41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/13 (1997).
84. See Cox, Strategic Approaches, supra note 17, at 38, 39-40, 42.
85. One commentator has written that
[s]tressing the refugees' right to compensation may well induce the country of
origin to create conditions to voluntary repatriation. In doing so, the country
would... remove or ameliorate the very conditions that gave rise to refugees in
the first place, foremost among which are violations of human rights and inter-
national law by the countries of origin themselves.
Luke T. Lee, The Right to Compensation: Refugees and Countries of Asylum, 80 AMER. J.
INT'L L. 532, 566 (1986).
86. The international community, in its efforts to ensure that compensation mecha-
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Finally, Annex Seven compensation rights, if supported by funding
from the Bosnian Government, could be an important precedent under
international law for the principle that refugees and displaced persons
have the right to receive compensation from the State of origin for property
to which they are unable or choose not to return.8 7 Although not yet fully
developed, such a principle would provide the living victims of "ethnic
cleansing" with partial redress for the wrongs committed by their State of
origin.
III. Legal Principles in Support of the Right to Compensation and
their Applicablility to Bosnia
This part examines whether there is legal foundation for the principle that
refugees have the right to receive compensation for their property from the
State responsible for their forced dislocation in lieu of return. Two widely
recognized principles of State responsibility88 in international law are that
a State is responsible for every wrongful act attributable to that State which
constitutes a breach of an international obligation,8 9 and that where a
nisms do not impede returns, could require municipalities to meet certain benchmarks
before being able to gain access to any compensation mechanism, e.g., the Annex Seven
Property Fund. See DPA, supra note 8, Annex Seven.
At the June 9, 1998 meeting of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the body
responsible for overseeing implementation of the DPA, the Steering Board, in conjunc-
tion with its continued support for minority returns, announced its support for locally
funded proposals to provide refugees and displaced persons with the fair opportunity to
receive compensation for their property in lieu of return. Declaration of the Ministerial
Meeting of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, Luxembourg, June
9, 1998, at cl 28. This represented the international community's first explicit post-
Dayton support for the concept of providing refugees and displaced persons compensa-
tion through sale, lease or exchange of property. See id.
Although the Bosnian Government may not have the financial resources necessary to
support a compensation scheme, the funding could be provided by a loan from the
World Bank. The CRPC has had some preliminary discussions with the World Bank
regarding such a loan. See Interview with Steven Segal, Executive Officer, CRPC, (July
28, 1998) (copy on file with author).
87. Article XVI of Annex Seven includes a provision that will place the burden of
financing the CRPC on the Government of Bosnia in December 2000. See DPA, supra
note 8, Annex Seven (providing that "[flive years after this Agremeent [i.e., the DPA]
takes effect, responsibility for the financing and operation of the Commission shall
transfer from the Parties to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, unless the Par-
ties otherwise agree"). The DPA, however, is silent concerning the burden of financing a
compensation mechanism after this date. See id.
88. The international law of State responsibility deals with principles and rules gov-
erning the conditions for and consequences of liability to a State, or other international
actor, for a wrongful act, i.e., an act in violation of an obligation imposed by interna-
tional law. See A.A. Fatouros, Transnational Enterprise in the Law of State Responsibility,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INJURIES TO ALIENS 361, 392 (Richard
Lillich ed., 1983) [hereinafter INjuRIEs TO ALIENS]. See generally MALCOLM SHAw, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 481-529 (3d ed. 1995); UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE REsPONSIBIL.
try (Marina Spinedi & Bruno Simma eds., 1987); II BRowNmu, SYsTEM OF THE LAw OF
NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY, Pr. I (1983).
89. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Pt. I, art. 1, adopted on first reading by
the International Law Commission, [1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, pt. 2 at 30-35, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 [hereinafter Draft Articles]. For commentary on this
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State has breached such an obligation it has the duty to provide reparation,
e.g., compensation.90 Although the law on State responsibility tradition-
ally created only inter-State obligations, a recent development has been the
imposition of international obligations on States towards individuals.91
This part discusses the applicability of these principles, in light of this
development, to the situation in Bosnia. Even if one believes that these
legal principles are inapplicable to the situation in Bosnia, this part con-
cludes that based on the text of Annex Seven itself, the obligation to pro-
vide compensation for property should fall on the current Bosnian
Government.
A. Principles of State Responsibility
1. Refugee Creation as an Internationally Wrongful Act
An internationally wrongful act occurs when (a) conduct consisting of an
action or omission is attributable to the State under international law and
(b) that conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that
State.92 The Special Rapporteur to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
has asserted that State responsibility comes into play when a State is in
breach of the obligation to respect internationally recognized human
rights.93 The legal basis for this obligation stems from international
human rights treaties and customary international law.94 In such a situa-
tion, the obligation of the State encompasses the duty not only to respect
such internationally recognized human rights, but also to ensure these
article, see Robert Ago, Second Report on State Responsibility [1970] 2 id. at 179-97, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1970/Add.1.
90. The Permanent Court of International Justice, in the Chorzow Factory case, said
that "[ilt is a principle of international law, that the reparation of a wrong may consist in
an indemnity corresponding to the damage which the nationals of the injured state have
suffered as a result of the act which is contrary to international law." Chorzow Factory
(Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.IJ. (Ser. A) No. 17, 1928, reprinted in ANN. DZG. PUB. INT'L L.
CASES 258, 260 (1929). See also Draft Articles, supra note 89, art. 43; Covey T. Oliver,
Legal Remedies and Sanctions, in INJUIES To ALENS, supra note 88, at 71; The Corfu Chan-
nel case, ICJ Reports 4, 23, reprinted in 16 INT'L L. RaP. 155 (1949).
In addition to compensation, other forms of reparation include restitution in kind,
satisfaction, and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition. See Draft Articles, supra
note 89, art. 42. See also SA-Iw, supra note 88, at 496-99; BROWNLIE, supra note 88, at
199-227.
91. See, e.g., STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL (Albrecht Randelzhofer &
Christian Tomuschat eds., 1999) (discussing the trend) [hereinafter STATE
RESPONSIBILITY].
92. See Draft Articles, supra note 89, art. 3.
93. See Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation, and Rehabilitation for
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1 41, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (July 3, 1993) [hereinafter van Boven Report].
94. See id. at 1 41. See also RESTATEmENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES § 702 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (providing that a "State violates cus-
tomary international law of human rights if, as a matter of State policy, it practices,
encourages, or condones (a) genocide (b) slavery or slave trade (c) murder or causes
disappearance of individuals (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment (e) prolonged arbitrary detention (f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights").
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rights, which may imply an obligation to prevent violations.9 5
Significant flows of refugees generally result from massive human
rights violations in the State of origin.9 6 This was emphasized in the Cairo
Declaration that states: "since refugees are forced directly or indirectly out
of their homes in their homelands, they are deprived of the full and effec-
tive enjoyment of all articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
that presuppose a person's ability to live in the place chosen as home" 97
For example, forced displacement is the denial of the exercise of freedom of
movement and choice of residence since it deprives a person of the choice
of moving or not and of choosing where to live. These freedoms are
expressly recognized as a basic human right in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) (Article 1311] and [21) and guaranteed in the Inter-
national Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (Article 12),98 which pro-
vides that "everyone lawfully within the territory of a state shall, within
that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose
his residence." 99
95. See Principle 2 of Revised Set of Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right of
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and International Humanita-
rian Law, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17 [hereinafter Basic Principles]; RESTATE-
MEr, supra note 94, § 702. See also Hannah Garry, The Right to Compensation and
Refugee Flows: A "Preventive Mechanism" in International Law, 10 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 97,
107 (1998); Chaloka Beyani, State Responsibility for the Prevention and Resolution of
Forced Populations Displacements in International Law, 1995 Special Issue, Irr'LJ. REFU-
GEE L. 130, 138 (1995); van Boven Report, supra note 93, Cf 41.
96. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Refugees and Their Human Rights, 18 FoRDnAm INT 'L LJ.
1079 (1995).
97. Principle 2 of the 1992 Declaration of Principles of International Law on Com-
pensation to Refugees, adopted by the International Law Association (Cairo, 1992),
reprinted in 87 Am. J. Irr'L L. 157, 158 (1993) [hereinafter Cairo Declaration].
98. Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. See also The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, at
71 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. The UDHR, a UN General Assembly resolution adopted
in 1948 without dissent, was originally not thought to entail international legal obliga-
tions. See Josef L. Kunz, The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 43 Am. J. INT'L
L. 316, 322 (1949). See also Richard B. Lillich, The Current Status of the Law of State
Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, in INjuius TO ALIENS, supra note 88, at 28. Today,
however, the UDHR represents customary international law binding upon all States.
See, e.g., de Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, supra note 15, at 271; F. NEWMAN & D.
WEISSBRODT, INTEm ATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1990) (citing Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d
1439 (9th Cir. 1989)); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of Rights of
Individuals Rather than States, 32 Am. U. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1982).
99. Id. The U.N. Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Pro-
tection of Minorities has asserted that "practices of forcible exile, mass expulsions and
deportations, population transfer, 'ethnic cleansing,' and other forms of forcible dis-
placement of populations within a country or across borders deprive the affected popu-
lations of their right to freedom of movement," in violation of UDHR Article 13 and
ICCPR Article 12. Res. 1995/13, 47th Sess. (1995).
The Subcommission, a non-governmental body, was created by the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights to "undertake studies, particularly in the light of the UDHR, and to
make recommendations to the Commission on Human Rights concerning the preven-
tion of discrimination of any kind relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms
and the protection of racial, national, religious, and linguistic minorities." E.S.C. Res. 9,
U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., cl 9, 10, U.N. Doc. E/RES/9 (II) (1946). See also ROBERTA COHEN
& FRANcIs DENG, MASSES IN FLIGHT 86 (1998).
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Moreover, forced displacement or expulsion would violate not only
UDHR Article 9, which guarantees the right to be free from "arbitrary
arrest, detention, or exile," but Article 17(2) as well, which states that "[njo
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."l00 Furthermore, as
Alfred de Zayas argues, the right to live in one's homeland, despite not
being expressly recognized in international human rights instruments, is a
necessary prerequisite to the enjoyment of most other human rights, and
thus must undoubtedly be a fundamental human right. 10 ' For example,
people who are deprived of the right to their homeland are also deprived of
the ability to exercise most civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights that are widely recognized in international law.' 02
In addition to contravening nearly all of the provisions of the UDHR, a
State's creation of refugees violates a number of other customary interna-
tional legal principles as well, such as the prohibition of deliberate mass
expulsion of a population and forced population transfers.' 0 3
100. UDHR, supra note 98, at 76. For a discussion of the right to property as an
internationally recognized human right, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 94, § 702, cmt. k.
101. See de Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, supra note 15, at 258.
102. See id.
103. The prohibition of population transfers is contained in the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention of 1949, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, and in Additional Protocol II of
1977. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, art 17,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609. Moreover, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg prose-
cuted the deportation of the native population and the implantation of settlers in occu-
pied areas as both a war crime and a crime against humanity. See 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, Nov. 14,
1945-Ocr. 1, 1946, at 411 (1948). See also de Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, supra
note 15, at 259.
A 1994 U.N. report stated that any "form of forced population transfer from a chosen
place of residence, whether by displacement, settlement, internal banishment, or evacua-
tion, directly affects the enjoyment or exercise of the right to free movement and choice
of residence within States and constitutes a restriction upon this right." The Human
Rights Dimensions of Population Transfer, Including the Implantation of Settlers: Progress
Report 17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/18 (1994) (statement by Awn Shawhat Al-
Khasawneh, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities). The report concluded that "[i]nternational law prohibits
the transfer of persons, including the implantation of settlers, as a general principle.
The governing principle is that the transfer of populations must be done with the con-
sent of the population involved. Because [such transfers are] subject to consent, this
principle reinforces the prohibition against such transfer." Id. 131.
Mass expulsion is prohibited by customary international law when practiced in a dis-
criminatory or arbitrary fashion, or when aimed at a particular group. The U.N. Sub-
commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities [the
Subcommission], the U.N. Commission on Human Rights [UNCHR], and the Interna-
tional Law Commission [ILC] all reached that conclusion. The Subcommission, relying
on customary law, affirmed the right of persons to remain in peace in their own homes,
on their own lands, and in their own countries. See E.S.C. Res. 1994/24, U.N. ESCOR,
49th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994.L.11/Add.3 (1994). The UNCHR concluded
that expulsion is a mass violation of human rights. See Human Rights and Mass Exo-
duses, Res. 1995/88, art. 3, UN ESCOR, 50th Sess. The ILC based its conclusion on
Article 21 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which
states that "deportation or forcible transfer of population" constitutes a systematic or
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2. The Duty to Compensate
A State that has breached an international obligation, such as forcing large
numbers of citizens from their homes, is obligated to make reparation. 10 4
Compensation appears to be the preferred and practical form of reparation
in State practice and international case law.' 0 5 Although the State is obli-
gated to provide compensation, to whom is this duty owed?10 6
Traditionally, "the offending State carries responsibility for its con-
duct vis-a-vis the injured State at the inter-State level" instead of the injured
individual person or group of persons. 10 7 However, some have argued that
the notion of State responsibility for breaches of internationally recognized
standards has been broadened in recent years. It has come to be applied
mass violation of human rights. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work
of the Forty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10. at 250, U.N. Doc. A/46/
10 (1992). See also John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and a Right of Return, 39 HARv.
J. INT'L L. 171, 220 (1998) (asserting that expulsion of population is inconceivable
under a regime of international law and irreconcilable with respect for human rights);
Kathleen Lawand, The Right to Return of Palestinians under International Law, 8 IrN'L J.
REFUGEE L. 532 (1996);J.M. HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND PRACTICE (1995); de Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, supra note 15, at 259
(asserting that the prohibition of collective expulsion and implantation of settlers must
be understood as a negative expression of one of the most fundamental rights of human
beings - the right to one's homeland); RESTATEMENT, supra note 94, § 702 cmt. m (char-
acterizing "mass uprooting of a country's population" as a human rights violation);
Alfred de Zayas, International Law and Mass Population Transfers, 16 HARv. J. INT'L L.
207, 257 (1975) (concluding that "[m]ass expulsions in any context violate important
principles of international [law].... The persons unjustly deported have a right to
compensation and also the right to return to their homeland").
104. The duty to make reparation is based on the fact that "[iln international law, as
in domestic law, rights without remedies are illusory, i.e., 'no rights' at all." Covey T.
Oliver, in INJURIES To ALIENS, supra note 88, at 61. See also Lee, supra note 85, at 536.
Absent the obligation "to make good the loss," there would be no duty on the part of
States to observe rules of international law. H. GROTIUS, DEJuPE BELLI Ac PAciS, bk. II,
ch. XVII, pt. 1, at 430 (1646 ed. Carnegie Endowment trans. 1925). See also Draft Decla-
ration of Principles of International Law on Compensation to Refugees and Countries of
Asylum, International Law Association, 63d Conference, Warsaw 1988, at 679 [herein-
after Draft Declaration], citing A. VERDROSS, VERFASSUNG DER VOLKERRECHTGEMEINSCHAFT
164 (1926).
105. See, e.g., Draft Articles on State Responsibility: Comments of the Government of the
United States of America 18 (Oct. 22, 1997), 37 I.L.M. 468, 479 (1998) [hereinafter Com-
ments of the United States]; Report of the Int'l L. omm'n on the work of its forty-fifth
session May 3 - July 23, 1993 at 168, GAOR 48th Sess. Supp. 10, U.N. Doc. A/48/10
(stating that "[c]ompensation is the main and central remedy resorted to following an
internationally wrongful act"); BROWNLIE, supra note 88, at 211; Oliver, supra note 88, at
71.
106. Principle 2 of the Cairo Declaration provides that "[a] State that turns a person
into a refugee commits an internationally wrongful act, which creates the obligation to
make good the wrong done." Cairo Declaration, supra note 97, at 158.
107. van Boven Report, supra note 93, 42. Thus, States and not individuals or
groups, could claim reparation from the violating State. See id. See also Christian
Tomuschat, State Responsibility and the Country of Origin, in THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN
THE LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES 59, 64 (V. Gowlland-Debbas ed., 1995) (not-
ing that none of the Special Rapporteurs on the International Law Commission on the
topic of State responsibility even addressed the rights of individuals injured in the case
of a State's breach of a human rights obligation); NIGEL RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PrIs.
omNEs UNDtER INTERNATIONAL LAw 97 (1987).
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"to persons within the jurisdiction of the offending State whenever those
persons are the victims of violations of internationally recognized human
rights committed by that State."' 08 Thus, "the obligations resulting from
State responsibility for breaches of international human rights
law... entail corresponding rights on the part of individual persons and
groups of persons who are under the jurisdiction of the offending State
and who are victims of those breaches."' 0 9 A number of international judi-
cial bodies" ° have heard individual complaints of victims who claimed
108. van Boven Report, supra note 93, 1 45. See also Preliminary Report on Diplomatic
Protection, Mohamed Bennouna, Special Rapporteur to the International Law Commission 1
34, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/484 (1998) (noting that "since the adoption of the
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there has
been a trend towards recognition of the right of the individual through a number of large
multilateral treaties," e.g., ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights).
With respect to human rights treaty law, the Inter-American Court has asserted that
the American Convention on Human Rights is designed to protect individuals and that
principles of State responsibility should be applied with respect to individuals. The
Court, in an advisory opinion, concluded that
... modern human rights treaties in general, and the American Convention in
particular, are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to
accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the con-
tracting States. Their object and purpose is the protection of the basic rights of
individual human beings, irrespective of their nationality .... In concluding
these human rights treaties, the States can be deemed to submit themselves to a
legal order within which they, for the common good, assume various obliga-
tions, not in relation to other States, but towards all individuals within their
jurisdiction.
The Effect of Reservations of the Entry into Force of the American Convention, Inter-
American Court, Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of Sept. 24, 1982, Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, Series A, Judgments and Opinions, No. 2, c 29. See also Meindersma-
Part 2, supra note 20, at 639 (asserting that "the violation of any human right gives rise
to a [basic] right of reparation for the victim"). The United States, however, does not
accept this broadened view of the law of State responsibility, believing instead, that the
offending State bears responsibility for its actions only towards the injured State at the
inter-State level.
109. van Boven Report, supra note 93, cl 45. See also U.N. Comm'n Hum. Rts. Res.
1998/43, available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu4/chrres/1998.res/43.htm>
(visited Apr. 26, 1999); U.N. Comm'n Hum. Rts. Res. 1997/29, available at <http://
unhchr.ch/html/menu4/chrres/1997.res/29.htm> (visited Apr. 26, 1999) (reaffirming
that victims of grave violations of human rights should receive, in appropriate cases,
restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation); Beyani, supra note 93, at 135; LAN BROWN-
LIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 512-13 (4th ed. 1990) [hereinafter BRoWNUE, PmN-
CIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW]; THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
NoRms As CusToMARY LAv 95-8 (1989).
Note that States of asylum, forced to bear much of the burden of refugee flows, are
also victhris of the wrong committed by States responsible for creating refugee flows.
For a discussion of the rights of States of asylum vis-a-vis States of origin, see, e.g.,
Beyani, supra note 95, at 131-32; Lee, supra note 85, at 566.
110. Such bodies include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European
Court of Human Rights, and the Human Rights Committee (HRC). The ICCPR created
the HRC, a special body of independent experts to oversee the covenant's
implementation.
Fifty-one states have accepted the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, under which
the HRC is granted competence to consider communications from individual
victims alleging violations of the ICCPR. Although the HRC is not a court with
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violations of the rights guaranteed in international human rights treaties.
These judicial authorities developed a significant body of case law where
the State was held responsible for a breach of obligation owed to an indi-
vidual under the particular treaty regime. 1 ' These developments could
eventually have an impact on the traditional law of State responsibility.
One such complaint was precipitated by the situation on Cyprus,
described in Part IV.B. In 1996, the European Court of Human Rights held
Turkey in violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' 1 2 for preventing the Greek
Cypriot plaintiff from returning to her land in Turkish-controlled northern
Cyprus for sixteen years. The Court held that this interfered with the Arti-
cle's guarantee of the right to enjoy possession of the land which one
owns.113 Nineteen months later, the Court further held that the applicant
was entitled to compensation from Turkey for the continuing violation. 14
Thus, individual victims of violations of international human rights
norms are now often entitled to effective remedies and just reparations
under international law. In practice the two alternative remedies following
"ethnic cleansing" seem to be the right to return to one's home of origin,
the power to issue judgments and it may only "forward its views" to the State
and individual concerned, its consideration of hundreds of communications
under the Optional Protocol has enabled it to interpret the ICCPR in a wide-
variety of specific fact situatations.
The HRC's decisions are published in its annual reports to the General Assembly. See
Hurst Hannum, Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INrRNATIONAL LAw 131, 140-
41 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., Cambridge 1997).
111. van Boven Report, supra note 93, 7 49. For a discussion of the case law, see id.
cc 53-68. See also State Responsibility, supra note 91 (various papers discussing indi-
vidual claims for reparations under ICCPR, CHR, and Inter-American Human Rights
Court); Jo M. Pasqualucci, Victim Reparations in the Inter-American Human Rights Sys-
tem: A Critical Assessment of Current Practice and Procedure, 18 MICH. J. Irr'L L. 1, 2-8
(1996).
112. Article 1 of Protocol I provides that "[elvery natural or legal person is entitled to
the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions." European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
113. See Loizidou v. Turkey 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2216 (1996); see also Beate Rudolf,
International Decisions: Loizidou v. Turkey, 91 AM. J. ITrr'L L. 532 (1997).
114. See Loizidou v. Turkey, 81 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1807 (1998) (concluding that the
"applicant was entitled to be fully compensated for loss of access to and control of her
property, but not for the diminished value of that property due to the general political
situation" and awarding 300,000 Cypriot Pounds (CYP) in pecuniary damages, CYP
20,000 in non-pecuniary damages to compensate for "the anguish and feelings of help-
lessness and frustration which the applicant must have experienced over the years in not
being able to use her property as she saw fit," and CYP 137,084.83 for costs and
expenses).
Article 50 of the ECHR provides as follows:
If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any
other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict
with the obligations arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal laws of
the said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of
this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just
satisfaction to the injured party.
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restitutio in integrum, or the right to receive adequate compensation for
one's property. 115
B. Compensation: The Bosnia Precedent?
This section discusses whether the legal principles that underlie the refu-
gees' right to compensation and the state of origin's duty to compensate
discussed above can be applied to the situation in Bosnia.
1. Refugee Creation and Internal Displacement in Bosnia -
Internationally Wrongful Acts
The gross human rights violations committed by all parties to the conflict
during the forty-three month war in Bosnia have been well documented.1 16
On a number of occasions, in addressing the situation in Bosnia, the Secur-
ity Council condemned the practice of "ethnic cleansing" in the region and
reaffirmed that any such practice is unlawful. 117 In addition, the United
Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination' 18
(CERD) denounced
the massive, gross, and systematic human rights violations occurring in the
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, most of which are committed in con-
nection with the systematic policy of 'ethnic cleansing'.. . in the areas under
Apr. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
115. See Meindersma-Part 2, supra note 20, at 638. The return to one's pre-war home
is the preferred remedy in such a situation. See id.
Principle Five of 1992 Declaration of Principles of International Law on Compensa-
tion to Refugees provides that
a State that has committed an "internationally wrongful act" through the genera-
tion of refugees shall be required, as appropriate (a) to discontinue the act; (b) to
apply remedies provided under the municipal law; (c) to restore the situation to
that which existed prior to the act; (d) to pay compensation in the event of the
impossibility of restoration of the pre-existing situation; and (e) to provide
appropriate guarantees against the repetition or recurrence of the act.
Cairo Declaration, supra note 97, at 158-59.
The question as to the level of compensation that should be required in such situa-
tions is beyond the scope of this article.
116. For detailed accounts of the violence and terror that were perpetrated against
one another by the three ethnic groups, see, for example, TAuEUsz MAzowiEciu, THE
SITUATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FoRmER YUGOSLAVIA (1992-1994).
117. See. e.g., S.C. Res. 941, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, preamb., U.N. Doc. S/RES/941
(1994) (stressing that "practices of ethnic cleansing constitute a clear violation of
humanitarian law"); S.C. Res. 859, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, preamb., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
859 (1993) (reaffirming unacceptability of practices of "ethnic cleansing"); S.C. Res.
836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, preamb., U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (1993) (reaffirming that any
practice of "ethnic cleansing" is unlawful and totally unacceptable); S.C. Res. 824, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Year, preamb., U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (1993) (reaffirming its condemnation
of "ethnic cleansing"); S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, at 1 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/820
(1993) (condemning the practice of "ethnic cleansing"); S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Year, at 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (1993) (reaffirming "its condemnation.., of the
practice of 'ethnic cleansing"'); S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Year, ci 2, 7, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/787 (1992).
118. CERD, which reports to the U.N. General Assembly, was established to monitor
compliance by states parties to the International Covenant on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination [ICERD]. It is composed of 18 independent experts
who meet twice a year in Geneva.
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control of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb authorities. All these practices
[constitute] a grave violation of all basic principles underlying the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.1 19
In its 1995 decision on the situation in Bosnia, the Committee reiterated
that "any attempt to change or uphold a changed demographic composi-
tion of an area, against the will of the original inhabitants, by whichever
means, is a violation of international law."120 Furthermore, the Special
Rapporteur of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights concluded in his
first report on the situation in the former Yugoslavia that "massive and
grave violations of human rights are occurring throughout the territory of
Bosnia and Herzegovina; violations are being perpetrated by all parties to
the conflicts."12 1 He added that these "acts of violence are tolerated and
often even encouraged by responsible authorities." 12 2 In a later report, the
Special Rapporteur reiterated
his outright condemnation of [practices of "ethnic cleansing" and popula-
tion transfer] which violate fundamental human rights including the right to
life, integrity of the person, property, privacy and family life, freedom of
thought, conscience, religion and of movement, to earn one's livelihood, to
nationality, and rights as a member of an ethnic or cultural group. 123
The "ethnic cleansing" campaigns that drove over two million people
from their homes, half of them across international borders, could qualify
as an "internationally wrongful act." The violations by the parties to the
conflict of the applicable norms of international humanitarian and human
rights law prohibiting mass expulsions, deportations and population trans-
fers, and demanding respect for private property, should therefore trigger
the international responsibility of the State, and provide grounds for the
obligation to make reparation. 1 24 The question then becomes whether the
Bosniak, Bosnian-Serb, and Bosnian-Croat political leadership can be held
legally responsible for acts committed during and in the aftermath of the
conflict.
2. The Obligation to Compensate in Bosnia
One could make a strong argument for imposing the burden of compensa-
tion on the current Bosnian Government. Not only is that government a
continuation, albeit in a different form, of the wartime Government of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the three nationalist political par-
ties largely responsible for the dislocation of over two million people, and
119. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. GAOR,
50th Sess., Supp. No. 18, 1 219, U.N. Doc. A/50/18 (1995) [hereinafter CERD Report].
See also de Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, supra note 15, at 281, 282. The UDHR is
the source of many of the principles enunciated in the ICERD.
120. CERD Report, supra note 119, c 26.
121. The Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 11 51, 52,
U.N. Doc. A/47.666 (1992).
122. Id. 53.
123. Id. cl 7.
124. See Meindersma-Part 2, supra note 20, at 638.
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the corresponding property rights violations during the war, continue to
play significant roles in the post-war government.
a. The Facts
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence from
the SFRY in March 1992, following a two-day referendum on independence
requested by the European Community in which 99.7% of those who went
to the polls - most Bosnian-Serbs boycotted - voted for independence.1 25
Shortly thereafter, in reaction to this declaration, both the Bosnian-Serbs
and Bosnian-Croats established separate break-away entities. In April
1992, the "assembly of the Serb nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina" proclaimed
the independence of the Republika Srpska of Bosnia-Herzegovina (RS).
During that same month, the war in the former Yugoslavia spread to Bos-
nia.126 On July 3, 1992, Mate Boban, the de facto leader of the Bosnian-
Croats, and their branch of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), pro-
claimed the state of Herceg-Bosna. This rump State consisted of much of
western Herzegovina, where the majority of Bosnian-Croats lived. 127
At its height, the RS controlled some 70% of the territory of the sover-
eign Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a result of the DPA, although
the Bosnian-Serbs still control 49% of the territory, their efforts to break
away from a sovereign Bosnia failed. The Bosnia created by Dayton is sim-
125. Only 63.4% of the eligible voters went to the polls; most Serbs did not. Voting
was rendered virtually impossible in the areas controlled by the Serbian Democratic
Party (SDS), the Serbian nationalist party. See, e.g., WOODWARD, supra note 5, at 195-96;
TIM JUDAH, THE SERBs 202-03 (1997); CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN
EUROPE, REFERENDUM ON INDEPENDENCE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA FEB. 29-MAR. 1 1992 23
(1992).
On April 6, 1992, the European Community recognized the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina as an independent state. MALcouM, BosNiA: A SHORT HISTORY 234 (1996).
The following month, Bosnia was granted membership in the U.N. General Assembly.
WOoDxWARD, supra note 5, at 10.
126. There has been considerable debate regarding the nature of this war, i.e.,
whether it was an internal or international armed conflict. The trial chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in an opinion and judgment
of May 7, 1997, recogiized that a state of international armed conflict existed in at least
part of Bosnia because of the armed conflict between the Bosnian forces and the JNA,
but determined that the nature of the conflict changed after May, 19, 1992, when the
JNA troops were withdrawn. Since then, the Court concluded, an internal armed con-
flict, i.e., civil war, was being waged between the forces of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the rump Serb republic, the RS. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case IT-94-1-T
(May, 7, 1997), excerpted in 36 I.L.M. 908, 922 (1997), summarized in Michael P. Scharf,
Case note, 91 AM. J. INr'L L. 718 (1997). Although in early April 1992 Belgrade did call
for the withdrawal of allJNA troops from Bosnia, a great part of the command of theJNA
stayed in Bosnia as a Bosnian-Serb army. SIBER & LirME, supra note 6, at 222-24. See
also Theodor Meron, Classification of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Nicara-
gua's Fallout, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 236 (1998) (criticizing this aspect of the opinion).
127. Although they engaged in fierce fighting in 1993, in March 1994, the Bosnian-
Croats and Bosniaks, under strong American pressure, signed the Washington Frame-
work Agreement, which established a Muslim-Croat Federation, within the internation-
ally recognized borders of Bosnia. See, e.g., Warren Bass, The Triage of Dayton, 77 FOR.
AiRus 95, 103 (1998); MARcus TANNER, CROATIA: A NATION FORGED IN WAR 292
(1997); WOOmVARD, supra note 5, at 314.
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ply the continuation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a
modified internal structure. 128 In fact, the heading of the article in the
Constitution providing for such continuity is appropriately labeled "Con-
tinuation."129 Thus, Bosnia remained one state divided into two parts, the
Federation, the Muslim and Croat entity that controls 51% of the territory,
and the RS.' 30 The DPA maintained the sovereignty of Bosnia but the Bos-
niaks were not the victors. 13 1 Despite failing to create an independent Bos-
nian-Serb state, the Bosnian-Serb land grab, commenced in April 1992, was
rewarded with the ratification of the RS, which has essentially become the
Bosnian-Serb fiefdom. 132 For the Bosnian-Croats, the Muslim-Croat Feder-
ation affirmed by the DPA, while not an independent state, is, nevertheless,
"a makeshift halfway house to secession by the self-proclaimed 'Croat
Community of Herceg-Bosna."'" 33 Although the Dayton Accords stipu-
lated the dismantling of Herceg-Bosna, this has yet to occur.13 4
The "continuity" in Bosnia, however, goes well beyond simply the
articulation in the Constitution. It extends to the ethnic-based political
parties responsible for the armed conflict that ravaged the region and
forced the displacement. These parties have largely remained in power fol-
lowing the cease-fire agreement. 135 In fact, many of the members of these
128. According to Article 1.1 of the Constitution (Annex Four), "[tihe Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. . . shall continue its legal existence under international law as a
state, with its internal structure modified as provided herein and with its present inter-
nationally recognized borders. It shall remain a Member State of the United Nations
.... " DPA, supra note 8, Annex Four, art. I. The Constitution provides for two function-
ing levels of government: a central government, with its capital in Sarajevo, headed by a
three-persons presidency that essentially consists of one member of each ethnic group;
and the two regional Entities: the Croat-Muslim Federation and the Bosnian-Serb
Republika Srpska.
129. Id.
130. Article 1.3 of the Constitution provides that "Bosnia and Herzegovina shall con-
sist of two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srp-
ska." DPA, supra note 8, art. 1(3).
131. See UNFINISHED PEACE, supra note 28, at 101.
132. See Bass, supra note 127, at 102. See also CHUCK SUDETIC, BLOOD AND VENGANCE:
ONE FAMILY's STORY OF THE WAR IN BOSNIA 52 (1998) (noting that the DPA "left the Bos-
nian-Serb nationalists.., the very thugs who had started the violence in the first place
in defacto control" of half of Bosnia); HOLBROOKE, supra note 29, at 361 (discussing the
ramifications of allowing Radovan Karadzic to keep the name Republika Srpska that he
had invented in the early spring of 1992).
133. UNFINISHED PEACE, supra note 28, at 81.
134. See id. at 82. The hardline Bosnian-Croat HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union)
continues to obstruct the return of Bosnian-Serbs and Bosniaks to their pre-war homes
in the Croat dominated region of western Herzegovina. These are indicators, however,
that this may change after the death of President Fudjman in December 1999.
135. In preparation for the then-Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina's first free elec-
tions on November 9, 1990, the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats, the three main communi-
ties in the republic, each formed separate political parties: the Serbian Democratic Party
(SDS), of which Radovan Karadzic was elected the first president, the Bosnian branch of
the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and the Muslim Party of Democratic Action
(SDA). See SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 6, at 206-09.
These nationalist parties captured a majority of the votes in the first post-war elections
held in September 1996. The first three co-Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina were
Alija Izetbegovic, head of the SDA, Momcilo Krajisnik, the RS Parliamentary Sepaker
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parties have yet to demonstrate that they have abandoned the objective of
ethnically pure regions.13 6 Almost three years after the DPA brought an
end to the fighting, Bosnia continues to be governed by ethnic-based par-
ties that effectively dominate three mini-states. 137
b. The Law
Since the Bosnian-Croats and Serbs joined the sovereign entity they were
fighting, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to form a new govern-
ment, that government should bear responsibility for the acts of both the
insurrgents and the legitimate government during the civil war.138 This is
supported by a recognized principle of state responsibility: the act of an
insurrectional movement which becomes the new or part of the new gov-
ernment of the State shall be considered as an act of that state.13 9
This principle has been adopted by the International Law Commission
(ILC). 140 In explaining its rationale, the ILC notes that in such a situation
"the State does not cease to exist as a subject of international law"'14 1 - as
it has in post-DPA Bosnia - when "its identity remain[s] the same, without
any break in continuity, despite the changes, reorganizations and adapta-
tions which occur in the institutions of the State."' 42 Therefore, it is neces-
sary to continue to attribute to the State, after the success of the
insurrectional movement, the conduct previously engaged in by the organs
of the pre-existing State apparatus. The principle is essentially "a categori-
cal imposition of responsibility for all acts of the insurgent forces," i.e., the
de facto government. 143 The ILC Commentary adds that "there is nothing
surprising in this" conclusion,144 which is "logically deducible from the
during the war and a member of the SDS, and Kresimir Zubak of the HDZ. The latter
two members were elected despite having never disavowed a separate Serb and Croat
state.
136. Richard Holbrooke commented about the first post-war elections held in Septem-
ber 1996 that chose the three person presidency and the national assembly, stating
"[n]one of the winners was in favor of a truly multi-ethnic government. The election
strengthened the very separatists who had started the war." HOLBROOKE, supra note 30,
at 344.
137. See Mike O'Connor, Political Parties Opposed to Bosnia Peace Get Millions in Rent
from NATO, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at A10.
138. THE INTERNATIoNAL LAW COMMISSION's DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY:
PART I arts. 1-35, 144 (Shabtai Rosenne ed., 1991) [hereinafter Commentary].
139. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 94, § 207, cmL b (asserting that a State is
"responsible for the conduct of any revolutionary regime that becomes the effective
government").
140. See Draft Articles, supra note 89, art. 15(1) (stating that "[tihe act of an insurrec-
tional movement which becomes the new government of a State shall be considered as
an act of that State.").
141. See Commentary, supra note 138, at 144.
142. Id.
143. BROWNLIE, supra note 88, at 178.
144. Commentary, supra note 138, at 144. In fact, none of the States that submitted
comments on the ILC's most recent Draft Articles on State Responsibility disagreed with
the principle articulated in Article 15(1).
The only recognized exception to this principle is when the insurrectional struggle
"ends in victory for the pre-existing power.., the insurrectional organization is dis-
solved, and only the established apparatus remains." Id. at 145, n.265. In such a case,
Cornell International Law Journal
fact that the acts of the insurgents have now become the acts of the govern-
ment, for which it must accept responsibility." 145 This principle, which
international tribunals have expressly recognized, 146 is "firmly rooted in
the practice of states and there seems little practical point in raising
doubts" 147 as to its validity.
Thus, under recognized principles of State responsibility, the post-
DPA Bosnian Government could be held responsible for the acts that drove
2.2 million from their homes, and thus be legally obligated to provide com-
pensation to those who are unable or choose not to return.
c. The Text of Annex Seven
Even if one does not accept that the principles of State responsibility
should be applied to the situation in Bosnia, one could still argue that,
based on the text of Annex Seven, the Government of the Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina is obligated to provide funding necessary to establish
the Refugees and Displaced Persons Fund, the Annex Seven mechanism
through which refugees and displaced persons are to receive compensation
for their property in lieu of return.' 48
Annex Seven, Article XIV(1) provides that a "Refugees and Displaced
Persons Property Fund (the Fund) shall be established in the Central Bank
of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be administered by the Commission."' 49
There is, therefore, a good faith obligation on the signatories of Annex
Seven to set up the Fund.'50 Article XIV(1), however, fails to specify who
shall bear responsibility for the initial cash injection that is needed to cre-
ate and begin operating the Fund, as it addresses only the "replenishing" of
the Fund.' 5 l Given this omission, one could argue that this duty, there-
the current state is not responsible for the acts of organs of the defeated movement,
which ceases to exist, never having been part of the ruling government. See id.
145. BROWNLIE, supra note 88, at 178, quoting CLYDE EAGLETON, RESPONSIBILITY OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (1928). See also GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW I 627-29 (3d ed. 1957); EDWIN M. BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTCTION OF
CrnzENs ABROAD 241-42 (1915).
146. See, e.g., Bolivia Railway Company Case, 9 REP. Ir'L ARB. AwARDs 445 (1903).
For a discussion of this and other decisions, as well as of the general consensus among
international legal scholars in support of this principle, see 1975 Y.B. oF THE INT'L L.
COMM'N V. II, at 102-05.
147. BROWNIE, supra note 88, at 178; MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, 8 DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 819 (1967) (noting U.S. support for this proposition). Professor Brownlie
does, however, note that the legal logic of this principle is far from certain.
148. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
149. DPA, supra note 8, Annex Seven, art. XIV(1) (author's emphasis).
150. The three signatories are the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federa-
tion, and the Republika Srpska. Article VII of the General Framework Agreement explic-
itly states that the Parties, i.e., the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of
Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, "agree to and shall comply fully with
the provisions concerning ... refugees and displaced persons as set forth in Chapter
One of the Agreement at Annex 7." DPA, supra note 8, art. VI1. Since the articles dealing
with the establishment of the Fund appear in Chapter Two of Annex Seven, one could
argue that the obligation to establish the Fund does not apply to them.
151. Article XIV(1) provides that the "Fund shall be replenished through the
purchase, sale, lease and mortgage of real property which is the subject of claims before
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fore, should fall on the signatories to Annex Seven, who agreed to imple-
ment all provisions of the Annex.
Thus, with the current lack of international donor support for the
establishment of the Fund, the Government of Bosnia, as one of the signa-
tories to Annex Seven, must, at a minimum, share the responsibility with
the other signatories, i.e., the Entity governments, for providing the money
necessary to operate the Fund.152
IV. The Refugees' Right to Compensation under International Law
Many commentators support the notion that refugees who are unwilling or
unable to return to their original homes are entitled to be compensated by
their State of origin, i.e., the State responsible for their plight, for property
they have left behind.' 5 3 This is asserted even though such a right does
not appear explicitly in any international human rights convention,' 5 4
though a number of U.N. General Assembly resolutions and declarations
by non-governmental bodies do bolster this right.'55 Despite this support
and the principles of State responsibility on which it rests, there have been
too few examples where the dislocated have actually been able to exercise
this right to receive compensation for it to be deemed part of customary
law. Despite this lacuna, however, "the right and duty of compensation in
the Commission [CRPC]. It may also be replenished by direct payments from the Par-
ties, or from contributions by States or international or nongovernmental organiza-
tions." DPA, supra note 8, Annex Seven, art. XIV(1).
152. Although there are three signatories to Annex Seven, this article addresses the
liability of the national government, not those of the Entities. In doing so, it does not
discuss the proportion of the financial burden for compensation that should fall on the
Entity-level governments.
The Entity governments are largely controlled by the same ethnic-based political par-
ties that control the national government and were largely responsible for the "ethnic
cleansing" during the nearly four year war. Thus, even if the three Annex Seven signato-
ries shared the burden of providing the money necessary to jump-start the Fund, those
responsible for the forcible mass dislocation that occurred during and in the aftermath
of the brutal war would still be the ones compensating those refugees and displaced
persons for property to which they are unable or choose not to return.
153. See, e.g., Garry, supra note 95, at 117; Benevisti & Samir, infra note 177, at 330
(asserting that "the principle that refugees are entitled to compensation for their lost
property is generally gaining recognition"); Dowty, supra note 37, at 26.
The refugees' right to compensation for non-property related injuries is beyond the
scope of this article.
154. Neither the right to repossession of or compensation for property are included
in the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). See ARTHUR HELTON,
PROPERTY AS AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
(1998) (copy on file with author).
155. Although General Assembly resolutions are generally non-binding on member
states, they have "contributed to defining more clearly certain general principles of inter-
national law for styles parties and have frequently served as the genesis for subsequent
multi-lateral treaties drafted and promulgated under U.N. auspices." Christopher
Joyner, Conclusion: The U.N. as International Lawyer, THE UNITED NATIONS AND IN'ERA-
TIONAL LAw, supra note 110, at 432; see also Brownlie, Principles of International Law,
supra note 109, at 107.
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the refugee context are justified and should be further advocated even if
this may remain largely symbolic at present."'15 6
A. Support for the Right
As early as 1939, it was noted that refugees are entitled to reparations from
the State responsible for their plight. 157 The international community's
initial affirmation of this principle came on December 11, 1948, when the
United Nations General Assembly addressed the then nascent Israeli-Pales-
tinian conflict, and adopted Resolution 194(111). The General Assembly
resolved that "the refugees wishing to return to their homes ... should be
permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation
should be paid for the property . . . which, under principles of interna-
tional law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or
authorities responsible.""18 In an earlier report, Count Bernadotte, the
U.N. Mediator on Palestine, had named the twin rights of repatriation and
compensation as forming part of "the basic premises" and "the specific
conclusions" for the settlement of the Palestine question. 159 One of the
seven basic premises states: "the right of innocent people, uprooted from
their home by the present terror and ravages of war, to return to their
home, should be affirmed and made effective, with assurance of adequate
compensation for the property of those who choose not to return."'160 Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 194(111) affirmed Bernadotte's conclusions.
Some commentators have asserted that the General Assembly, in
attributing the refugees' right to compensation to "principlei of interna-
tional law or . . . equity," was simply "restating pre-existing law or
equity." 161 One observer, in fact, contends that Resolution 194(111), para-
graph 11, "explicitly bas[ed] the right of refugees to compensation on
156. Garry, supra note 95, at 117
157. See Robert Y. Jennings, Some International Law Aspects of the Refugee Law Ques-
tion, 20 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 98, 112 (1939).
158. G.A. Res. 194, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 2, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
159. U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 11), U.N. Doc. A/648 (1948), at 17-18.
160. Id.
161. Luke T. Lee, The Preventive Approach to the Refugee Problem, 28 WILLIAMErE L.R.
821, 829 (1992). See also Principle 7, Commentary ' 5, Draft Declaration of Principles
of International Law on Compensation to Refugees and Countries of Asylum, reprinted
in 63 I.L.A. 686 (1988) [hereinafter Draft Declaration].
George Tomeh, in an article he wrote while Permanent Representative of Syria to the
United Nations, asserts that paragraph 11 of the resolution recognizes both a right of
refugees to return to their homes and a right to compensation for those choosing not to
return, and foresees implementation of these rights "under principles of international
law or equity." George Tomeh, Legal Status of Arab-Refugees, in 1 THE ARAB-IsRAELI CON-
Fucr 687 (Moore ed., 1974). In criticizing this interpretation of the language regarding
refugee return, some commentators have stated that the paragraph merely "recommends
that the refugees 'should' be permitted to return," but does not recognize their "right" to
do so. While they question whether "the reference to principles of international law or
equity" applies to "return", they share the view that such language does apply to the right
to compensation. Ruth Lapidoth, The Right of Return in International Law, with Special
Reference to the Palestinian Refugees, 16 ISR. Y.B. Hum. RTS. 103, 116 (1987). See also
Kurt Rene Radley, The Palestinian Refugees: The Right to Return in International Law, 72
AM. J. INT'L L. 586, 601 (1978).
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'principles of international law or equity,"' in its efforts to "imbue the right
with a legal, and not merely a moral and political character." 162 As part of
its continuing efforts to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the General
Assembly has reaffirmed Resolution 194(111), paragraph 11, every year
since 1948, "with the support of the United States and virtually every mem-
ber nation except Israel."163 Thus, annual and near unanimous support of
this paragraph has strengthened the legal validity of this right.164
Despite the non-legally binding nature of individual General Assembly
Resolutions, the plethora of resolutions that reaffirm the right of refugees
to receive compensation could be deemed to have legal significance
because of the role they serve in the codification and progressive develop-
ment of international law.16 5 When a resolution, such as Resolution
.194(111), paragraph 11, restates existing international law, as it dearly
does, its binding force on Member States of the United Nations is not
based on the resolution per se, but on the declared law, which remains
binding on all States.
162. Lee, supra note 85, at 534-35.
163. Kathleen Lawand, The Right to Return of Palestinians in International Law, 8 INr'L
J. REFUGEE L. 532, 545 (1996). For a detailed review of the numerous General Assembly
resolutions reaffirming Res. 194 (111), paragraph 11, see RexJ. Zedalis, Right to Return:
A Closer Look, 6 GEo. IMMIG. J. 499, 508-14 (1992); John Quigley, Family Reunion and
the Right to Return to the Occupied Territory, 6 GEO. IMMIG. LJ. 223, 239-40 (1992); W.T.
Mallison & S. Mallison, An International Law Analysis of the Major U.N. Resolutions Con-
cerning the Palestine Question, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/SER.F/4 (1979).
164. In each of these repeated reaffirmations of Resolution 194 (III), paragraph 11,
by focusing on compensation only for one's "property," the General Assembly has
refrained from passing judgment on whether countries of origin are obliged to compen-
sate refugees for other losses such as deaths, personal injuries, wrongful arrest, deten-
tion or imprisonment, and emotional and mental anguish. Given the General
Assembly's emphasis on property losses, refugees seeking compensation for such losses
may have a stronger legal argument to make than those seeking compensation for other
losses. Moreover, since property losses are often easier to value, they are more easily
compensated. See Lee, supra note 85, at 546.
Further, the repeated reaffirmation of the resolution, by a near-unanimous vote, con-
stitutes evidence of the opinions of governments in the widest forum for the expression
of such views. See BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 109, at 14;
see also Si-AW, supra note 88, at 94.
165. Article 13(1)(a) of the United Nations Charter states that the "General Assembly
shall initiate 'studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:
(a) . . . encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codifica-
tion." U.N. CHATER art. 13(1)(a). The work of the International Law Commission and
the adoption by the General Assembly of numerous declarations, e.g., the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights and the Declaration on Principles of International Law con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, are good examples of such activities. See, e.g., Lee, supra
note 161, at 829; Draft Declaration, supra note 161, at 686. See also Hurst Hannum,
Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 145 (Christopher Joyner
ed., 1997) (noting that adoption by the General Assembly and other bodies of formally
non-binding declarations, statements of principles and ordinary resolutions can have an
impact on the creation of international law).
For a thorough discussion of the legal significance of the re-citation of General Assem-
bly resolutions, see, for example, Blaine Sloan, General Assembly Resolutions Revisited
(Forty Years After), 58 BwrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 39, 74-76 (1987); Samuel A. Bleicher, The Legal
Significance of Re-Citation of General Assembly Resolutions, 63 Am. J. INr'L L. 444 (1969).
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Some thirty years after it first spoke on the subject of a refugee's right
to compensation in lieu of repatriation, the General Assembly addressed
the topic once again. In 1981, it established a Group of Governmental
Experts on International Cooperation to Avert New Flows of Refugees,
whose tasks were to study the root causes of massive flows of refugees and
to propose a strategy to avert such phenomena. 166 As the guiding princi-
ple for the Group, paragraph 3 of Resolution 36/148 stressed "the right of
refugees to return to their homes in their homelands and reaffirm[ed] the
right ... of those who do not wish to return to receive adequate compensa-
tion" for their property. 167 This resolution, however, addressed only the
right of refugees, remaining silent as to any corresponding obligation of the
State of origin.
During the 1985 session of the General Assembly, Singapore empha-
sized that if the "root causes [of refugee flows] were to be tackled in an
effective manner, there must be a firm resolve to increase the political and
economic cost" to refugee-generating countries through the imposition of
appropriate sanctions. 168 The most fitting sanction, one commentator has
asserted, would be to require "countries of origin to pay compensation to
refugees." 169 Not only would this provide them with some redress for the
violations of international law that their country of origin committed when
it forced or induced their flight, but it might also deter such countries from
future acts. 170 In a report transmitted by the Secretary General to the Gen-
eral Assembly, the Group specifically recommended that the General
Assembly call upon Member States to respect, as their obligation, the right
of refugees to be facilitated "in returning voluntarily and safely to their
homes in their homelands and to receive adequate compensation there-
from, where so established, in cases of those who do not wish to
return."'171 The General Assembly unanimously endorsed the conclusions
and recommendations of this report.172
Neither this report nor Resolution 194(111), however, identifies or elab-
orates upon specific principles of international law that should govern
compensation to refugees. Thus, following the General Assembly's
endorsement of the above report, the International Committee on the Legal
Status of Refugees of the International Law Association (ILA) began work
on refining and elaborating the U.N. Group's conclusion that the rights of
refugees include the right to be adequately compensated by the country
166. See G.A. Res. 36/148, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/148 (1981).
167. Id. 1 3. For a general discussion of Palestinian refugee and international law,
see, e.g., ALEx TAKKENBERG, THE STATUS o1 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAw (1998).
168. U.N. GAOR, Special Political Comm. (10th mtg.) at 11-12 U.N. Doc. A/SPC/40/
Se,.O (1985).
169. Lee, supra note 85, at 566 (adding that such countries should also pay compen-
sation to countries of asylum to shift the refugee burden off of the latter and onto the
countries responsible for the crises).
170. See id.
171. Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on International Cooperation to Avert
New Flows of Refugees, U.N. Doc. A/41/324 (1986), 1 66(0.
172. See G.A. Res. 41/70, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/70 (1986).
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responsible for the creation of their refugee status. In the Declaration of
Principles of International Law on Compensation to Refugees, adopted by
the ILA at its 1992 Conference in Cairo (Cairo Declaration), the ILA
declared that legal principles support the conclusion that countries respon-
sible for the creation of refugee flows have a legal obligation to compensate
refugees should they choose not to return to their homes.' 73 Although the
declarations of a non-governmental body such as the ILA are non-binding,
there appears to be support for the legal principles that the ILA invokes in
support of its conclusions.' 74
B. Implementation?
Despite the legal foundation on which the refugees' right to compensation
and the numerous statements in support of the right itself over the last fifty
years, the implementation of this right following the forcible dislocation of
a population has generally been unavailable. 175 Rather, it remains "little
more than a pious ideal."' 76 The reasons for this unavailability include the
complexity and volume of the claims, the lack of political will on the part
of the parties, the inability to reach agreement on the level of compensation
to be provided, and the failure to include provisions regarding compensa-
tion for property left behind in a prior agreement on the exchange of
populations.
The 1919 Treaty of Neuilly, signed by Bulgaria and Greece, provided
for the relocation of 46,000 Greeks from Bulgaria and 96,000 Bulgarians
from Greece.' 7 7 The 1923 Treaty of Lausanme,1 78 which, according to one
173. See Cairo Declaration, supra note 97, Principles 1, 4. Principle 4 states that a
"State is obligated to compensate its own nationals forced to leave their homes to the
same extent as it is obligated by international law to compensate an alien." Id. at 4. See
supra Part III for a discussion of these principles.
174. See Beyani, supra note 94, at 134, n.15 (noting that the Cairo Declaration,
although not legally binding, "is persuasive and may have an indirect legal effect in the
context of the specific application of State responsibility as general principles of law").'
175. See Tomuschat, supra note 106, at 74 (writing that "[alithough the legal reason-
ing may be developed to [support a right to compensation] without any apparent flaws,
one cannot ignore the fact that there is little practice confirming the existence of a duty
to pay financial compensation"); James C. Hathaway, Reconceiving Refugee Law as
Human Rights Protection, 4J. REFUGEE STUDIES 113, 119 (1993).
176. Guy GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 221-22 (1996).
177. See Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the Future
Israeli-Palestinian Settlement, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 294, 321 (1995). See also Convention
Respecting Reciprocal Emigration, Nov. 27, 1919, Gr.-Bulg., 1 L.N.T.S. 68. This Conven-
tion implements Article 56(2) of the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and
Turkish Populations, Nov. 27, 1919, reprinted in 2 THE TRATIES OF PEACE, 1919-1923, at
1036 (1924).
178. Treaty of Peace, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11. This Treaty was a reaction to the
significant presence of Muslim refugees in Greece in the early 1920s. Turkish forces had
attacked Asia Minor, Smyrna, and Eastern Thrace, areas with large Greek populations.
Greece and the Allies "suffered severe defeats and as a result of the military disaster in
Smyrna in September 1922, by the end of the Greco-Turkish war, hundreds of thousands
of Greeks were either massacred or forcibly uprooted from their homelands and com-
pelled to flee to Greece." Christa Meindersma, Population Exchanges: International Law
and State Practice - Part 1, 9 INr'LJ. REFUGEE L. 335, 338 (1997).
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commentator, "wrote 'ethnic cleansing into the formal language of diplo-
macy,"179 provided for the compulsory mutual exchange of populations
between Greece and Turkey: more than a million Greeks who had previ-
ously been Turkish citizens and about 500,000 Turks who had formerly
been Greek citizens were forced to depart for the other side.'8 0 Following
conclusion of these two treaties, the national governments seized the
immovable property that the expellees left behind and used it, when neces-
sary, for public purposes. Although these agreements did not grant the
expellees the right to repossess this property, they did provide procedures
for compensating refugees for lost property and for calculating the amount
of compensation.' 8 '
Although Bulgaria and Greece paid some compensation for property,
the Greek-Turkish arrangement proved too difficult to implement. After a
series of negotiations, the two sides agreed that each would assume the
rights to the property left in its jurisdiction. They then proceeded to set off
the claims for compensation, and Greece was required to make a one-time
payment of 425,000 drachmas to the Turkish government.' 8 2
To settle the dispute between Hindus and Muslims in British India, an
agreement on population transfer was adopted in 1947. This resulted in
the partition of the subcontinent into two states, India and Pakistan,
requiring the relocation of millions.' 8 3 As with the population transfers
described above, the two governments seized the immovable property left
by the expellees, which they then used to settle incoming refugees,' 8 4 and
179. ROGER COHEN, HEARTS GROWN BRUTAL: SAGAS OF SARAJEVO 62 (1998).
180. See id. Article 1 states that "[als from May 1, 1923, there shall take place a
compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek orthodox religion established in
Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek
territory; these persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without
the authorization of the Turkish Government or the Greek Government respectively."
Treaty of Peace, supra note 178, art. 1.
181. See STEPHEN P. LADA, THE EXCHANGE OF MINORITIES: BULGARIA, GREECE AND TUR-
KEY, 335-588.
182. Convention Greco-Turque, signed on June 10, 1930, reprinted in LADAs, supra
note 181, at 817. See also Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 177, at 330; Meindusma I,
supra note 178, at 344-45.
183. See id. at 323; RUssELL BRINES, THE INo-PA ISTANI CONFLICT 18-48 (1968);
CHAUDHRI MUHAmmAD Au, THE EMERGENCE OF PAKISTAN (1967). Ali estimates that nine
million people relocated to West Pakistan. Id. at 274.
184. See Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 177, at 323 n.164; Au, supra note 181, at
267-70. Benvenisti and Zamir write:
Legally, the property left by refugees was administered in each province by a
custodian of evacuee property. This system stemmed from an Indian-Pakistani
agreement to protect the property of refugees, expressed in a joint declaration of
the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan issued on September 3, 1947, which
stated that "both governments will take steps to look after the property of refu-
gees and restore it to its rightful owners;" . .. The system was based on the
assumption that the relocation of populations might be a temporary phenome-
non, and that many would eventually return to their homes. As time passed,
and return seemed more and more unlikely, the attitude of the Governments
changed, and "the refugee's title to property he had left in the other Dominion
became thin and shadowy and finally disappeared."
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agreed on a compensation scheme for property left behind.1 8 5 Although
India and Pakistan agreed on a system of compensation, disagreements
over the actual valuation of the property, as well as political difficulties,
impeded implementation.1 8 6
With respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the General Assembly
established a three-member U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine
(CCP) to press for a settlement and seek implementation of other aspects
of Resolution 194(111), including the right to compensation.18 7 In 1951 the
CCP proposed a scheme to settle the issue of compensation for Arab refu-
gees.188 According to this plan, Israel would pay
as compensation for property abandoned by those refugees not repatriated,
a global sum based upon the evaluation arrived at by the Commission's Ref-
ugee Office;... a payment plan, taking into consideration the Government
of Israel's ability to pay, [would] be set up by a special committee of eco-
nomic and financial experts to be established by a United Nations trustee
through whom payment of individual claims for compensation would be
made.18 9
Given the limit of Israel's economy at that time, "the CCP suggested
that Israel make piecemeal payments to the special committee over a
period of many years. Until the full payment was made, other sources
would provide the committee with funds for disbursement to the refu-
Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 177, at 323 n.164 (quoting Au, supra note 183, at 268).
185. See AL, supra note 183, at 270 (discussing Inter-dominion agreement in January
1949).
186. Id.
187. See G.A. Res. 194(111), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 21, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); see
also 1948 U.N.Y.B. 176 (appointing Turkey, France, and the U.S. members of the CCP).
In addition to enunciating the twin rights to return and receive compensation, Resolu-
tion 194 (III) of December 11, 1948, paragraph 11 also instructed "the Conciliation
Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabili-
tation of the refugees and the payment of compensation." G.A. Res. 194 (III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., at 24, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). The young government of Israel stated
it was "prepared to pay compensation for land abandoned in Israel by Arabs who have
fled" but only as part of a general peace settlement. The Right of Return of the Palestinian
People, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/SER.F/2 (1978), at 27, quoting U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/AC.25/W.81/Rev.2, cl 39, 46.
188. During the period between December 1947 and September 1949, as a result of
the Arab-Israeli conflict following the U.N. partition of Palestine, a major exodus of Pal-
estinian refugees took place. It is estimated that between 600,000 and 700,000, Pales-
tinians left, ran away, or were expelled from the territory on which the State of Israel was
established. This flight, which involved roughly half of the population of the territory,
left some 370 villages abandoned. See Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 177, at 297. Esti-
mates of the number dislocated differ; according to the U.N., some 700,000 Palestinians
became refugees. See SHLoMo GAzrr, THE PALEsTINiAN REFUGEE PROBLEM 2 (1995). Some
independent researchers, however, think that the number was closer to 539,000. See
TERRENCE PRIarnE & BERNARD DINEEN, THE DOUBLE EXODUS: A STUDY OF ARAB AND JEwISH
REFUGEES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 8-9 (1974).
189. Progress Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, U.N.
GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 18, Ann. A, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/1985 (1951) [hereinafter
Progress Report].
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gees."'190 While Israel accepted the principle of compensating Arabs for
property they had abandoned in Israel and was willing to try to resolve this
issue, 19 1 it insisted that further discussions were needed to determine how
to value the property. 192 The Palestinians, on the other hand, demanded
prompt payment based on the "true value" of the property and provided on
an individual basis rather than in the form of a lump sum. 193 In addition,
they refused to allow the size of Israel's economy to be linked to the total
amount of compensation that the Palestinian refugees should receive. 194
Because of these differences, the parties were unable to agree on a mutu-
ally acceptable compensation scheme at that time' 95 and have never been
able to agree on a scheme that would compensate Palestinian refugees for
property they abandoned during the conflict. 196
Finally, in an effort to provide a basis for resolving the decades-old
conflict between the Turkish and Greek communities on Cyprus,19 7 a con-
190. Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 177, at 336. See also Progress Report, supra note
189, at 6.
191. Progress Report, supra note 189, at 8.
192. The issues affecting valuation were: that Arab property had been abandoned
following the Arab aggression of 1948; that Israel's ability to pay was affected by the
Arab boycott and the need to absorb Jewish refugees from Arab countries; that Jewish
property had been abandoned in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the 1948 war;
and thatJewish property had been confiscated in other Arab countries. See id. at 8, 18-
19.
193. See Progress Report, supra note 189, App. II, at 22.
194. See id.
195. The CCP estimated the value of lost Palestinian property at 1.22 million British
pounds, or approximately $1.85 billion. The Arab League countered with its own esti-
mate twenty times greater - some $35 billion in 1990 dollars. Rex Brynen, The Funding
of Palestinian Refugee Compensation 1, FOFOGNET Digest (Mar. 1996) (visited Apr. 26,
1999) <http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PrrN/papers/brynenl.html>.
196. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text. Analysts of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict have almost universally viewed compensation for lost property as a central and
necessary feature of a final settlement of the refugee issue.
In addition to these examples of the failure to implement provisions regarding com-
pensation in agreements following or precipitating mass population transfers, the Inter-
American Commission's recommendation that Nicaragua pay adequate compensation
to the Miskito Indians for their loss of property following their mass flight across the
border into Honduras has been completely ignored, i.e., the Government of Nicaragua
has never paid the Miskitos. Interview with Milton Castillo, Staff Attorney, Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 4, 1998); ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF A SEGMENT OF THE NIcA-
RAGUAN POPULATION OF MISK1TO ORIGIN AND RESOLUTION ON THE FRIENDLY SETTLEMENT
PROCEDURE REGARDING THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION OF A SEGMENT OF THE NICARAGUAN
POPULATION OF MISKITO ORIGIN, 21 (1983).
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights recommended that the Nicaraguan
Government not only had to assist in the resettlement of displaced persons who wished
to return to their former lands, but also had to provide them with adequate compensa-
tion for their property. The Commission found Government of Nicaragua was responsi-
ble for the mass flight of Miskitos, some 8000 of whom were subsequently settled in
refugee camps in Honduras. See id. at 29-31.
197. InJuly 1974, following 11 years of civil strife of Cyprus, Turkish military forces
occupied the northern third of the island. As a result of the Turkish invasion and the
ensuing atrocities, some 180,000 Greek Cypriots fled to the Greek controlled southern
part of the island. An estimated 45,000 Turkish Cypriots living in the south moved to
the Turkish controlled territory, settling into homes vacated by Greek Cypriot owners.
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flict that has resulted in the displacement of some 200,000 people on the
island, the U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali formulated a "Set
of Ideas on an Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus." 198 As part of
the Secretary General's efforts to strike a balance between the interests of
the displaced persons and the goal of creating homogeneous communities,
the Framework provides that all displaced persons have the option to
return to their former residences or to claim compensation for property
located in the federated State administered by the other community.19 9
Although the Set of Ideas was endorsed by the Security Council,
neither the Greek- nor Turkish-Cypriots have accepted it, and the
thousands of displaced persons remain unable either to return to their
home or to receive compensation for property left behind when they fled
following the Turkish army's landing on the island in 1974. Thus, despite
being included in many of the agreements that precipitated or resulted
from mass population movements in the twentieth century, compensation
has generally not been available to those refugees unable or unwilling to
return to their homes.20 0
For an overview fo the conflict, see, for example, ZAIM M. NECATIGIL, THE CYPRUS QuEs-
TION AND THE TURKISH POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1996); PETER Loznos, THE
HEART GROWN BITTER: A CHRONICLE OF CYPRIOT WAR REFUGEES (1981).
198. Report of the Secretary General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, U.N.
Doc. S/24472, Annex, at 9-22 (1992) [hereinafter "Set of Ideas"].
199. The Set of Ideas, in fact, provides a structure for settling the displaced persons'
compensation claims, in which one can see the seeds of the framework of DPA Annex
Seven, Chapter II:
76. Each community [i.e., Greek and Turkish] will establish an agency to deal
with all matters related to displaced persons.
77. The ownership of the property of displaced persons, in respect of which
those persons seek compensation, will be transferred to the ownership of the
community in which the property is located. To this end, all titles to properties
will be exchanged on a global communal basis between the two agencies at the
1974 [time of the Turkish invasion] value plus inflation. Displaced persons will
be compensated by the agency of their community from funds obtained from
the sale of the properties transferred to the agency, or through the exchange of
property. The shortfall in funds necessary for compensation will be covered by
the federal government from a compensation fund....
The Department of State lawyers used the Framework Agreement's provisions con-
cerning compensation for property of displaced persons who do not wish to return to
their homes as a model when drafting Annex Seven of the DPA, which enunciates the
right of refugees and displaced persons to receive compensation for their property, and
establishes the CRPC.
200. The agreements that led to the most significant population movements of the
20th century neglected to address the issue of compensation. The Potsdam Declaration,
issued by the Allies at the end of the second world war, provided for the transfer, "to be
effected in an orderly and humane manner," to Germany of the remaining 15 million
Germans in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Austria. Protocol of Proceedings of
the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, Aug. 2, 1945, art XIII, 3 Bevans 1207 (this provision is
redesignated art. XII in the final version of the protocol). These Germans were expelled
from areas where their ancestors had been living for 700 years. For a review of these
events, see, for example, ALFRED DE ZAYAS, A TERRIBLE REVENGE: THE ETHNIC CLEANSING
OF THE EAST EUROPEAN GmuLANs, 1944-1950 (1994); ALFRED DE ZAYAS, NEMESIS AT POTS-
DAM (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter DE ZAYAS, NEMESIS]. Other transfer agreements, involving
smaller numbers of people, were implemented in parts of Central and Eastern Europe
Cornell International Law Journal
In short, very few examples exist where States of origin have compen-
sated refugees for property which they abandoned following forcible dis-
placement. One significant instance involves the payment of 78.4 billion
Deutsche Marks by the German Government to victims of Nazi persecution
who were forced to leave Germany during the Nazi era, as compensation
for loss of property, liberty, and dignity.201 Fulfilling its obligations under
the 1954 Transition Agreement, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
enacted the "Supplementary Federal Law for the Compensation of the Vic-
tims of National Socialist Persecution" of June 24, 1956, and the "Final
Federal Compensation Law" of September 14, 1965. Under these laws,
programs for restitution and compensation were established. The former
law sought to compensate those persecuted for political, racial, religious, or
ideological reasons, whereas the latter provided compensation for property
lost or confiscated. To date, this is the most comprehensive system of com-
pensation for victims of persecution let alone refugees.20 2 In a review of
this important precedent, one commentator, remarking on the positive
impact that such compensation has had in Germany, noted that for numer-
ous victims,
payments have meant the difference between abject poverty and a dignified
life with modest security .... The persecutions by the Nazi regime were
unparalleled and unique in their scope and inhumanity. They cannot be
atoned and cannot be forgotten. However, from an historical and legal point
following the redrawing of borders after the war. See EUGENE KULISHER, EUROPE ON THE
MovE 282-88 (1948).
The Declaration failed to deal with the return or compensation of the refugees.
According to one estimate, after the Second World War, West Germany absorbed and
rehabilitated some 5,978,000 displaced persons from Poland and 1,891,000 from Czech-
oslovakia. SeeJuLIus STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 22 n.27 (1981). The Germans trans-
ferred lost title to the property that they had left behind. According to one
commentator, the issue of compensating these Germans was raised by the Allies, but no
formal commitment was made, apart from the general promise in the Potsdam Declara-
tion for "orderly and humane" transfers. DE ZAYAS, NEmEsis, supra, at 103.
In the early 1990s, following the collapse of the East and Central European commu-
nist regimes, the Czech Republic rejected the claim to compensation for Sudeten Ger-
man property and this difficult issue, one of many resulting from the post-war
population transfers, remains unresolved. See Benevisti & Zamir, supra note 177, at
322, n.153. The Czechoslovak-German Treaty on Good Neighborly Relations and
Friendly Cooperation of February 27, 1992 did not address this issue. See id. at 322-23.
201. See German Restitution for National Socialist Crimes (last modified Oct. 21, 1999)
<http://www.germany-info.org/newcontent/index-gic.htm>.
202. For a thorough discussion of the different mechanisms the FRG Government
used to compensate the victims of Nazi persecution, see, for example, Kurt Schwerin,
German Compensation for Victims of Nazi Persecution, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 479 (1972); for
a discussion of the restitution and compensation for property taken by the U.S.S.R. and
the German Democratic Republic, see, for example, Annette D. Elinger, Comment,
Expropriation and Compensation: Claims to Property in East Germany in Light of German
Unification, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 215 (1992); Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Law of
German Unification, 50 MD. L. REv. 475 (1991); Dorothy Ames Jeffress, Note, Resolving
Rival Claims on East German Property upon German Unification, 101 YALE L.J. 527
(1991).
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of view, the compensation program and reparations constitute a unique
operation.
20 3
Conclusion
For many of the dislocated Bosnians, receiving some compensation for the
property to which they are unable or choose not to return would mean the
difference between a life dependent on international aid and one affording
them the means to resolve their displacement. Many Bosnia-observers,
however, fear that implementation of the right to compensation in Annex
Seven of the DPA will have a negative impact on the efforts of the interna-
tional community to recreate a multi-ethnic Bosnia. Yet securing compen-
sation, provided for in Annex Seven and arguably supported by accepted
principles of international law, on behalf of Bosnian refugees and dis-
placed persons is important for a number of reasons. Beyond the needed
financial assistance it would provide individual refugees and displaced per-
sons, it would render a measure of justice to those dislocated during the
war who genuinely do not wish to return to their pre-war homes and who,
four years after the signing of the DPA, have largely been ignored by the
international community. Although the Office of the Prosecutor at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has
indicted a number of individuals allegedly responsible for, inter alia, the
"ethnic cleansing" campaigns that ravaged Bosnia during the war, a more
individualized measure of justice may be needed. After all, "is it realistic to
suggest that symbolic prosecutions will somehow vindicate the suffering of
victims?"20 4 Even if the ICTY is successful, and convicts fifteen to twenty
defendants, including people of high position and responsibility for
crimes, will the millions of Bosnians who bear the scars of the conflict feel
that justice has been attained - particularly if their situations continue to
be desperate?20 5
Implementing the right to compensation enunciated in Annex Seven
and requiring the current Bosnian Government to provide such compensa-
tion, would have ramifications beyond Bosnia as well. It could serve as an
important precedent supporting the right of the dislocated, following a
mass dislocation to receive compensation from their State of origin for
property in lieu of return and would be an important step toward this prin-
ciple becoming more than simply a "pious ideal."20 6 The further develop-
ment of this right, with its corresponding obligation on the State of origin,
may be one way to address the dramatic rise in the number of refugees and
displaced persons in the last forty-five years.20 7 It might not only provide
203. Schwerin, supra note 202, at 523.
204. Payam Akhavan, 20 HUM. RIGHTS Q. 737, 775 (1998)
205. See HARRY STEINER, HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM & WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION, TRUTH
COMMISSION: A COMPARATIvE ASSESSMENT 70-71 (1997) (visited Apr. 26, 1999) <http://
www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/HRP/Publications/truth3.html.
206. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 176, at 221.
207. Since 1951, the number of refugees, largely the result of ethnically motivated
conflicts, has grown rapidly from 1.2 million to a total of 13.2 million in 1996, with an
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the international community with a mechanism to hold governments
responsible for the consequences of their gross human rights violations but
guarantee a remedy to the dislocated victims of such breaches of interna-
tional law.
equally large increase in the number of internally displaced persons. Ms. Sadako Ogata,
United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, Statement at the 53d Session of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights (Apr. 1, 1997), in 9 INr'LJ. REFUGEE L. 528, 530 (1997).
The further development of this right and corresponding obligation of the State of
origin would only have a deterrent effect in a State where there is an identifiable govern-
ment that can be held responsible for the refugees fleeing from that territory. Thus,
while it might have had an impact in Kosovo, where Slobodan Milosevic, the authorita-
rian President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and his military police bear respon-
sibility for the massive refugee flows of this past year, it would not have had an impact in
preventing the recent mass dislocation that has affected Sierra Leone, where there has
been a complete collapse of the State.
